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Resumo
Esta tese aborda o problema de desenvolver uma lógica e as técnicas de model-checking asso-
ciadas de forma a verificar propriedades de segurança, e a sua integração na ferramenta Spatial
Logic Model Checker (SLMC).
Nas áreas de desenho e análise de sistemas distribuídos, existe bastante trabalho relacionado
com a verificação da correcção de propriedades de sistemas. Neste âmbito, grande parte do
trabalho orientado para a verificação de propriedades de segurança recorre a métodos precisos
mas informais.
Neste trabalho, apresentamos uma simplificação do cálculo de processos Applied pi-calculus,
introduzido por Abadi and Fournet, para o estudo de protocolos de segurança. Seguidamente,
desenvolvemos uma lógica espacial para o cálculo, extendida com modalidades relacionadas
com conhecimento, com o objectivo de analisar protocolos de segurança utilizando o conceito
de conhecimento local de processos.
Adicionalmente, mostramos que as extensões são consistentes e completas em relação à
semântica pretendida, não tornando a lógica indecidível, assumindo algumas hipóteses ra-
zoáveis. Apresentamos também um algoritmo de model-checking e a prova da sua completude
para uma classe considerável de processos.
Finalmente, apresentamos uma implementação em OCaml do algoritmo, integrada na ferra-
menta SLMC, desenvolvida por Hugo Vieira e Luís Caires, produzindo assim a primeira ferra-
menta orientada para a análise de protocolos de segurança baseada numa lógica espacial.
Palavras-chave: Análise de Protocolos, Lógicas e Linguagens Formais, Lógicas Espaciais,
Model-Checking
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Abstract
This thesis tackles the problem of developing a formal logic and associated model-checking
techniques to verify security properties, and its integration in the Spatial Logic Model Checker
(SLMC) tool. In the areas of distributed system design and analysis, there exists a substan-
tial amount of work related to the verification of correctness properties of systems, in which
the work aimed at the verification of security properties mostly relies on precise yet informal
methods of reasoning.
This work follows a line of research that applies formal methodologies to the verification of
security properties in distributed systems, using formal tools originally developed for the study
of concurrent and distributed systems in general. Over the years, several authors have proposed
spatial logics for local and compositional reasoning about algebraic models of distributed sys-
tems known as process calculi.
In this work, we present a simplification of a process calculus known as the Applied pi-
calculus, introduced by Abadi and Fournet, designed for the study of security protocols. We
then develop a spatial logic for this calculus, extended with knowledge modalities, aimed at
reasoning about security protocols using the concept of local knowledge of processes.
Furthermore, we conclude that the extensions are sound and complete regarding their in-
tended semantics and that they preserve decidability, under reasonable assumptions. We also
present a model-checking algorithm and the proof of its completeness for a large class of pro-
cesses.
Finally, we present an OCaml implementation of the algorithm, integrated in the Spatial
Logic Model Checker tool, developed by Hugo Vieira and Luis Caires, thus producing the first
tool for security protocol analysis that employs spatial logics.
Keywords: Protocol Analysis, Mathematical Logic and Formal Languages, Spatial Logics,
Model-Checking
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1 . Introduction
With the advent of the Internet, there has been a widespread dissemination of distributed sys-
tems that take advantage of the flexibility and ubiquity of the Net to provide services to users
such as e-commerce, home banking, etc. However, the ubiquity and distribution that these sys-
tems require in order to fulfil their objectives introduces new problems. Several problems arise
from the absence of a global state, which limits the information that the several components
of a system can have about each other (e.g. it is impossible to distinguish a component failure
from a network failure). Another great class of problems of distributed systems is related to the
security of the systems themselves.
Since potentially anyone can access the Internet, all communications that take place over
this medium are inherently insecure in the sense that they can be intercepted and produced by
anyone. Therefore, if a system deals with sensitive information (such as financial systems) it is
paramount that it be robust enough to prevent the openness of the medium from interfering neg-
atively with the system’s operation. The research problem therefore lies in finding techniques
that allow the development of systems in such a way that they are protected against these (and
other) threats.
In distributed systems, security encompasses a great variety of fields such as access control,
auditing and security protocols. A security protocol consists of a set of actions that aim at es-
tablishing some security properties, inevitably using cryptographic techniques [58]. In protocol
research, there are two naturally arising categories. One focuses on cryptography: drawing on
information theory and number theory, for instance, to develop more sophisticated and elabo-
rate crypto-techniques [37]; the other focuses on the protocols themselves [25]: how (and if) the
message sequences work at achieving the desired properties and what practices can aid protocol
engineering and design.
When focusing on protocols as a means to achieving security properties, there exist several
approaches to the problem of analysing security protocols, with varying degrees of formalism.
On the formal landscape, there exist many different ways of tackling this problem, and several
have proved to be successful in validating or disproving security protocols [42, 56, 57]. Some
techniques employ complexity-theoretic artefacts, others use formalisms crafted specifically for
the problem and some are based on algebras and logics. Regardless, all these methods share the
common goal of verifying if a protocol is correct in respect to its desired properties.
When considering the techniques based on process algebras we can distinguish at least two
distinct types of approaches: one deals with a high-level specification of the protocol, with
which its easier to observe the required properties, and then establishes an equivalence between
the specification and the abstract representation of the protocol. The other, which this thesis
focuses on, uses the same abstract representation (model) of the protocol but instead of proving
equivalencies with specifications, checks that the desired properties (expressed through logical
formulas) hold in the model.
In this context, there exist a considerable number of process calculi and logics that are able
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2to model and reason about interesting properties of distributed systems such as local deadlock
freedom and safety in resource usage. A particularly interesting class of logics that have been
proposed are spatial logics. These logics take advantage of the fact that many of the interesting
properties of distributed systems can be interpreted in spatial terms. For example, connectivity,
which states that there is always an access route between two different sites, can be viewed as a
property of the spatial arrangement of systems. While the more traditional logics for concurrent
and distributed systems deal with notions of behavior, spatial logics aim to characterize the
spatial and temporal dynamics of systems, being able to separate and reason about different
sub-components of a complex system.
When dealing with security protocol verification however, different types properties arise.
For instance, its essential that secrecy (the critical information exchange performed in a protocol
cannot be obtained by attackers), among other properties, holds in a protocol that seeks to
establish secure communication channels.
1.1 Motivation
The underlying motivation for this thesis is that many interesting properties of security proto-
cols can be interpreted as the possibility (or impossibility) of a participant (or attacker) of the
protocol to obtain a certain piece of information, that is, the capability of some sub-component
of a system to know a piece of information. In fact, security protocols are fundamentally about
ways of limiting knowledge (of attackers) and augmenting or certifying knowledge (of princi-
pals). Therefore, since both attackers and principals can be interpreted as sub-components of
larger systems, the combination of knowledge reasoning with the key notions of spatial logics
(local reasoning) follows naturally as a way of verifying security protocols. While the concept
of reasoning about knowledge isn’t necessarily new in this field, the usual approach deals with
observable (and global) or exposed knowledge, which provides a much coarser analysis when
compared to local knowledge reasoning. Also, most of the existing logics in this area that deal
with knowledge are too separated from the underlying operational model, which can result in
an increased difficulty to accurately represent properties that mix knowledge with (high-level)
operational details of protocols.
In this new framework, secrecy can be viewed as the impossibility of an attacker, when
paired with a system running the protocol, to know the pieces of information that are required
to be secret in the protocol, such as keys. Another interesting set of properties that can be
expressed in terms of this notion of local knowledge is protocol correctness in regard to the
proposed “goal" of the protocol. For instance, in a key distribution protocol, the protocol is
correct if it ensures that the participants (which can be viewed as sub-components of a system
that implements such a protocol) eventually know the distributed keys (and maintains secrecy
of the keys).
31.2 Goals
The goal of this work is twofold: we seek to devise a logic that by combining the standard spatial
connectives with knowledge (epistemic) modalities, allows local reasoning about information
(both obtainable and constructible) of security protocols. It is also our intent to develop a model
checking algorithm for the logic, in order to realise a tool for security protocol analysis.
Our logic operates over models represented by a process calculus. Therefore, we aim at
developing a calculus with which to represent security protocols, by drawing inspiration from
other established calculi with similar intent. This formal representation has enough expressive-
ness to model security protocols by modeling the principals of the protocol as processes with
the ability to exchange messages, composed by names or applications of functions to names (to
model standard security techniques such as encryption or hashing).
The modalities allow us to write assertions about the information a process holds, by in-
specting what values are present and what values can be obtained by applying functions to the
messages (this can model the use of keys to decrypt cyphered messages). For instance, if a
process has a cyphered message and the key used in the cypher, its possible to assert that the
process also has (knows) the contents of the message.
Our logic hence aims to provide a detailed analysis of security protocols and their cor-
rectness, since not only it allows reasoning about exposed knowledge (by reasoning about the
exchanged messages), but also of the flow of information inside a closed system (with the aid
of the spatial connectives).
Besides the development of the logic and a model-checking algorithm, we also develop
correctness proofs for our algorithmic approach. Finally, we extended the Spatial Logic Model
Checker tool (a model-checker for spatial logics) with the knowledge modalities developed for
the logic, in order to provide a proof of concept tool that uses this framework for protocol
verification.
1.3 Contributions
The contributions of this work are as follows:
• We developed a process calculus model for security protocols, inspired in existing pi-
calculi. We augmented the standard pi-calculus with structured terms that can be used in
communications, in order to model cryptographic operations. We also added a special
output prefix that models non-deterministic attacker outputs.
• We introduced a spatial-behavioural-epistemic logic, oriented towards security protocol
analysis, with precisely defined syntax and semantics. Such a threefold approach is novel
in the field, seeing as other related work in this area focuses solely on epistemic or spatial
approaches.
• We developed a formal theory of knowledge deduction for our pi-calculus models, realised
through a sequent calculus formulation.
4• We obtained soundness, completeness and decidability results for our formal theory,
which ultimately result in the decidability of the logic itself.
• We realised an implementation of a model-checking algorithm for the logic as an exten-
sion to the SLMC tool, thus producing the first tool aimed at security protocol analysis
using spatial logic model checking.
We validate our approach with our formal correctness results and with analyses of examples,
performed using our proof of concept tool.
1.4 Document Structure
This document is structured as follows: Chapter 2 describes in detail the context in which this
thesis is inserted, going from the broader notions of security and distributed system analysis, to
more concrete work on process calculi and logics, having the security protocol analysis “hori-
zon" present along the presentation and throughout the examples.
Chapter 3 describes in detail the work developed in this dissertation, clarifying the mo-
tivations and proceeding to present the model and logic developed in this dissertation, each
accompanied with explanations and running examples. In Section 3.3 we present our sequent
calculus formulation of a proof system for knowledge formulas and the theoretical results that
aim at validating this work.
Chapter 4 details our extensions to the SLMC tool, by first giving some insight on the syntax
and implementation of the original version and then going into our extensions per se. We then
present two examples of protocols analysed using our tool, first a simple toy protocol and then
the Needham-Schroeder protocol, as a way of validating our extensions and showing how the
tool can be used to reason about protocols.
2 . An Overview of Security Analysis
This chapter presents the areas and body of work in which this thesis is inserted. Section 2.1
gives a broad view on the aspects of security, its applications, the need for protocol verification
and some of the methodologies used in these analyses. Section 2.2 starts by giving a brief
introduction on the techniques used to study concurrency theory and introduces the unified view
of concurrency theory and security analysis using process calculi. Sections 2.2.2 through 2.2.7
present several of the most relevant contributions to the fields of concurrency and distributed
system analysis using formal methods, specifically with process calculi and process logics,
showing the progress from the earlier process calculi and logics that focused specifically on
concurrency, to the more modern and sophisticated frameworks that reason about distributed
systems in general, and enable security protocol analysis using richer calculi and logics.
2.1 Security in Computer Science
The problem of security is present in almost every aspect of Computer Science. Be it in oper-
ating system design, where the system level processes must be separated and secured from the
user level ones, or in distributed systems, where complex security requirements such as authen-
ticity of principals and message integrity are required, security is a concern of many fields in
CS.
Despite being an aspect that touches many fields, the area in which security has had most of
its application (and the area that generated most advances to security in general) is the area of
distributed systems [27, 31, 61, 39, 41, 26]. While other areas have some security requirements,
none have such a strong need for security as the distributed systems field of work. In this area,
due to the uncertainty that is inherent to distributed systems, because of the absence of global
state for example, security appears as a way of providing more information about this uncertain
state, such as the exact identity of the emitter of a message, or a guarantee that only a certain
number of principals can obtain some piece of information.
Realistically, distributed systems use a wide spectrum of tools developed in the field of se-
curity because they are required to, due to the open medium over which communications take
place (usually the Internet). Since, in theory, anyone could potentially intercept all informa-
tion exchanged in a distributed system, security guarantees are required to protect sensitive
information and to protect the systems against malicious users. For example, home-banking or
e-commerce systems both provide services that deal with information that, if divulged, would
have dire consequences to its users. Therefore, such systems require that the communications
with clients respect certain properties in order to assure that no harm comes from their usage.
For example, these systems commonly need to be certain that the entity they are communicat-
ing with is in fact a valid client, or require that all communications with the clients are such
that no eavesdropper can use them in a malicious way, or often a combination of both these re-
quirements. In essence, security in distributed systems appears as a natural necessity due to the
5
6nature of the medium used to support communication and information exchange, to circumvent
malicious use of information and to control and monitor its access.
2.1.1 Applications of Security
Security in distributed systems focuses on specific properties which appear naturally as security
requirements. These security properties, although being requirements of concrete systems, exist
at a high level of abstraction, since they are general enough to be of interest to any system with
security requirements. As mentioned previously, systems often require that communications are
held secretly, in order to protect their contents. This property is known as confidentiality, or se-
crecy, and is standard in practically all contexts where security techniques are applied. Another
common property, authenticity, relates to making sure that the participants in communications
are “who they say they are”. Communication integrity relates to being able to certify that ex-
changed messages are received exactly as they were emitted, that is, their data wasn’t tampered
with in any way. The concepts of authorisation or access control, while of importance to secu-
rity in general, are of a more concrete nature then the abstract notion of authentication, seeing
as generally the authentication of a principal authorizes it’s access to generally inaccessible
services or information.
Given some properties that must hold in a system, like authenticity and confidentiality, its
necessary to devise a procedure that will establish the desired properties. This procedure is
called a security protocol. Inevitably, security protocols employ cryptographic techniques to
achieve said properties [58] and much work exists with the goal of improving the existing
cryptographic schemes [51, 37, 50]. In fact, some sophisticated protocols such as the Transport
Layer Security [27] protocol and the Secure Socket Layer [31] protocol combine several crypto-
systems together to further strengthen its security guarantees. In some scenarios, protocols also
enforce properties that are not specifically barriers against attacks but properties that focus on
legal aspects such as non-repudiation [62] (assurance that a party cannot refute the validity of a
message).
Most security protocols focus on establishing secure channels between parties with varying
degrees of security: some focus specifically on message integrity and confidentiality [28], others
on participant authentication [49], and several combine all these security properties [61, 39].
In general, security protocols use a variety of tools to accomplish their goals: cryptography
to ensure confidentiality or integrity, timestamps (nonces) for freshness proofs [26], message
sequence numbers, padding, among many other security artefacts.
2.1.2 Analysis and Verification of Security Protocols
Despite the technicalities that security protocols use, their goal is to establish some desired
security properties. Due to their highly sensitive nature, it becomes fundamental that some sort
of verification or analysis technique is employed, in order to assure that the properties are indeed
always established, and that no attacker can interfere negatively with the protocol in some way.
7A great number of successful analysis techniques actively employ formal methodologies to
obtain the required analysis [10, 8, 38, 24, 57, 7].
Some formal approaches (for instance [10]), represent the protocol using message sequences
and then reason if (or how) an attacker can exploit the messages exchanged in rounds of the pro-
tocol. However, the relation of some of these techniques to the operational details is perhaps too
tenuous. Several classes of attackers are usually considered, with varying degrees of attacking
power. Other techniques are more implementation oriented (such as [49]) which focus more
on the implementational aspects then on the conceptual problems of protocols - being valid
analysis techniques nonetheless.
Formal reasoning frameworks prove to be useful since they provide a degree of rigourous-
ness that is deeply relevant due to the critical nature of security protocols, leading to an increase
of the confidence of some protocols and the discovery of limitations and flaws in others. Another
interesting point of formal techniques is that in some cases they enable the use of automated
tools like theorem provers [52] or model-checkers [7] to assist the analysis process. Formal
methodologies require the development of an abstract representation of the fundamental con-
cepts of interest to the analysis, in this case of the relevant security artefacts. To achieve such
an abstract view of protocols, formal methods require a model in which to focus their efforts.
Ideally, this model (which encompasses the formal representation of protocols, cryptography,
attackers, etc.) will be as complete as possible, in the sense that it should include as much
relevant details as possible, all the while abstracting away details which are not relevant to the
analysis of the protocol itself.
In the formal “world” of security there exist two fundamentally distinct models: the com-
plexity-theoretic model and the symbolic model. In this work, we focus on the symbolic model
of security due to its tractability. We will now approach the scope and limitations of the sym-
bolic model, by motivating it against the complexity-theoretic one.
2.1.3 The Formal Symbolic Model: Scope and Limitations
Protocols are usually modelled as programs, written in some formal notation, or as the set of
possible executions of the protocol. This representation is usually accurate, since it focuses on
the relevant operational steps of the protocol such as the crypto operations it performs on data
and the messages that are sent and received over a network. As mentioned, the model must also
include a representation of attackers. Generally, attackers are seen as agents that can interfere
with runs of the protocol at any point: they can interfere with several runs of the protocol, in-
tercept messages on any communication channel and inject any message they can produce (or
replay). This view of attackers, while very realistic, is hard to represent formally. Given that
an attacker can inject any message it can produce, it must be considered as a non-deterministic
agent, but without the ability to guess the keys or timestamps that are of relevance to the proto-
col. A solution to this problem that is used in the complexity-theoretic model is to represent the
attacker as a probabilistic program, subject to some complexity bounds. Unfortunately, such an
approach is very hard to use in practice.
8The attacker model considered in the formal symbolic model stems from the work of Dolev
and Yao [29]. This approach provides a simple solution to the guessing problem described
earlier, by making every non-deterministic choice of keys and nonces generate a fresh value -
one that by definition cannot have been used before. The formal representation of cryptographic
operations usually relies on some assumptions that simplify the model (to a somewhat idealised
level, as explained further below):
• Given a cypher key, anyone can produce a message encrypted with such a key.
• Given a cypher key and a message encrypted with that key, anyone can produce the de-
crypted values.
• Encrypted messages cannot be produced by agents who do not possess both the clear
values and the keys.
• Neither the key nor the clear contents of a cyphered message can be derived from it
without knowing the key.
• Decryptions with wrong keys result in evident failures.
This symbolic view of cryptography, despite being simplistic, is often effective because such
an abstract view of the cryptographic operations is usually sufficient for the analyses. However,
this simplification comes at a price: some types of attacks (such as bitwise shifts on keys or
nonces, or pattern analysis in messages) are excluded by the model itself, making it impossible
to analyse the occurrence of such attacks using these symbolic methodologies. This critique of
the symbolic model is usually presented by the complexity-theoretic view of cryptography and
security, that presents a much higher level of detail that takes into account complexity bounds
on attackers and probabilities of analysing repeated patterns in cypher-texts, as mentioned pre-
viously.
Despite the limitations present in the symbolic model regarding its idealisations, the method-
ologies it provides can result in rich frameworks for the analysis of security protocols, success-
fully testing for the occurrence of several classes of attacks (for example [42] where Lowe
describes an attack on the Needham-Schroeder protocol using a tool called FDR). Additionally,
there are currently some research efforts with the objective of providing a rigourous justification
for such an abstract treatment of cryptography, such as [4], where Abadi and Rogaway prove
that the symbolic representation of cryptographic operations is sound when analysed in lower
level computational models, at least with high probability and against attackers of bounded
computational power (as those studied in the complexity-theoretic models), under reasonable
hypotheses.
Seeing as this view of security is inserted in the context of distributed systems in general,
we will now overview some of the work on formal models and analysis of concurrent and
distributed systems that have been proposed thus far.
92.2 Concurrent and Distributed System Analysis
In parallel to the efforts developed for security protocol analysis, a great amount of work has
appeared regarding the systematic analysis and study of concurrent and distributed systems
in general. This work generally branches in two areas (that very often intertwine): the one
that deals with the formal and systematic modelling of relevant concerns in concurrent and
distributed computation, such as the notion of process, communication, mobility; and the one
that deals with the formal reasoning about properties of said systems.
Many approaches exist in the mathematical modelling of concurrent computation. However,
the greatest body of work in this area most likely lies in the paradigm of process calculi. A
process calculus is essentially a formal modelling language of concurrent systems, providing an
abstract operational description of interactions between a set of independent agents or processes,
combined with algebraic laws that allow processes to be manipulated in an equational fashion,
thus allowing formal reasoning about equivalencies between processes.
2.2.1 Bridging Concurrency and Security Protocol Analysis
Process calculi provide such a rich framework in which to study concurrent and distributed sys-
tems and their properties from an operational perspective, that they have begun to be used in the
analysis of security protocols. The formal approach to security protocol analysis starts with a
high-level representation of the protocol (with varying degrees of operational detail). Usually,
this representation takes the form of a program-like description of the protocol, in which the
relevant aspects of the protocol are represented (application of cryptographic operations, re-
ceiving and sending messages, etc.). As will be presented later, process calculi provide similar
representations of concurrent and distributed systems. Additionally, since security protocols
are usually applied to distributed systems, process calculi with enough expressive power to rep-
resent the operations required to model security protocols present themselves as a union point
between the study of concurrency and distribution, and the analysis of security protocols, since
a security protocol can essentially be viewed as an abstract distributed system.
We will now present the bulk of work in the area of process calculi and frameworks for
reasoning about concurrent/distributed systems in general, moving towards the calculi and tech-
niques developed for and used in security protocol analysis.
2.2.2 The pi-calculus
Despite not being the first full fledged process calculus ever developed (that being Milner’s
Calculus of Communicating Systems - CCS [43]), the pi-calculus is without a question the most
influential and important of the foundational process calculi.
While CCS results in an interesting model of concurrency, its standard version lacks expres-
sive power for many common features of concurrent systems such as divergent behaviour, value
passing communication and dynamically rearrange-able configurations.
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P,Q F 0 (Null process)
| P|Q (Parallel composition)
| (νn)P (Name restriction)
| α.P (Action prefix)
| !P (Replication)
α F m(x) (Input action)
| m〈n〉 (Output action)
Figure 2.1: The pi-calculus Syntax
To address these concerns, Milner introduced the pi-calculus [44], a further development of
the work on CCS, with the design goal of producing a minimal language, yet expressive enough
to, unlike CCS, model the full spectrum of concurrent computations.
The language itself is similar to CCS, although with a few subtle differences. The core
notion of the pi-calculus is that of names. A name in the calculus plays a dual role, representing
both communication channels and variables. In fact, the minimality of the language results
from this duality. In light of this binary notion of name, the core calculus allows (monadic)
communication of a name through a channel (which is also a name), allows restriction of a
name to the scope of a process, parallel composition of processes and replication of processes
(potentially infinite copies of a process running in parallel). Name restriction can be viewed as
fresh name creation, in the sense that a restricted name is such that no other equal name may
exist. In Figure 2.1 we present the core syntax of the pi-calculus. P and Q refer to processes, n
and m are names and x is a variable.
One of the most important features of the pi-calculus is called scope extrusion of names.
This relates to the capability of a process, given some name restricted in its scope, to commu-
nicate this name through a channel, thereby broadening the scope of the name to that of the
receiving process. This feature models mobility of names, and therefore of channels, allowing
for a system’s configuration to change over time in the sense that channels can be created and
exported to different components of the system.
Although being a minimal language, the pi-calculus has been proved to be Turing-complete
in [45], where Milner presents two encodings of the λ-calculus using the pi-calculus. The en-
codings (one simulating the call-by-value reduction strategy and the other call-by-name) were
done using a new formulation of the pi-calculus inspired by Berry’s and Boudol’s work [6]. This
result aims to show that the pi-calculus is to concurrency as the λ-calculus is to functional com-
putation, that is, the pi-calculus can be viewed as a canonical (and complete) way of modelling
arbitrary concurrent processes, in the sense that it possesses enough expressive power to encode
any computable (concurrent or otherwise) computation. Another similar result is given in [54],
where Sangiorgi shows that a version of the pi-calculus where processes can be communicated
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through channels provides no greater expressive power than the standard version of the calculus.
Essentially, these results motivate an approach to the study and analysis of concurrent sys-
tems in general that is based on the pi-calculus or on calculi that augment the pi-calculus with
some extra features of interest to the domain to be studied. Such is the approach chosen in this
work.
Following the work on process equivalencies developed for CCS, several process equiva-
lencies were introduced for the pi-calculus, depending on the intended level of detail that the
equivalence aims at capturing. A standard equivalence is structural congruence (≡), which
despite being mostly used as a technical device to simplify the operational semantics of the
calculus, relates processes that are structurally identical, allowing for an algebraic treatment of
processes.
Perhaps a more interesting set of process equivalencies, that equate processes up to be-
haviour instead of up to structure, are the early and late bisimilarities. The underlying principal
of a bisimulation relation is a relation that equates systems that behave in the same way, in the
sense that both can simulate the actions of the other. The idea is that two processes are bisimilar
if they cannot be distinguished in any way from each other by an external observer.
The notions of early and late stem from the fact that in pi, processes can communicate names.
In late bisimilarity, the intuition is that processes are equivalent if they behave the same way
(in the simulation-sense) regardless of the names that are input, that is, the equated processes
denote the same function of input names. Early bisimulation provides a simpler definition of
bisimilarity in which the matching of actions depends on the name being communicated (the
name early derives from the fact that the input names are instantiated earlier in the bisimulation).
Both these definitions were presented in [47, 48].
The intent of these equivalencies is to capture indistinguishability of processes under differ-
ent contexts and to give a (much desired from an analysis perspective) compositional flavour to
the semantics of the process operators of the calculus. However, neither early nor late bisimilar-
ity are congruences for all operators of the calculus. To address this problem, a third definition
of bisimilarity, called open bisimilarity, was presented by Sangiorgi in [55].
Bisimilarities in the pi-calculus present themselves as tools for the analysis and study of
concurrent and distributed systems, with the added bonus that the expressivity of the pi-calculus
is much greater than that of previous calculi (like CCS). Tools for the automated verification of
such equivalencies already exist, such as [59].
Although this thesis doesn’t focus specifically on process equivalence techniques, their rel-
evance arises from the fact that they are central to the characterisation results of logics for the
pi-calculus, in the sense that many logics aim to characterise specific process equivalencies,
providing a higher level analysis tool for the same set of processes, while some intend to dis-
criminate more processes then the standard bisimilarities, and therefore produce richer analyses,
as will be seen throughout this report.
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P(ch,msg) , ch〈msg〉.ch(x).P(ch,msg)
Q(ch,ack) , ch(y).ch〈ack〉.Q(ch,ack)
R , (νch)(P(ch,msg) | Q(ch,ack))
Alice , (νch)pub〈ch〉.ch(x).0
Bob , pub(y).y〈data〉.0
S ys , Alice | Bob
Figure 2.2: Examples of pi-calculus Processes
2.2.2.1 Brief Examples
In Figure 2.2 we present two simple examples of pi-calculus processes.
The system on the left hand side consists of three processes, P, Q and R. Process P sends a
message msg over a channel c and waits for a reply on the same channel, repeating this behavior
indefinitely; process Q behaves symmetrically to P - receiving a message over a channel c and
sending an acknowledge over c. Process R composes P and Q in parallel, generating the channel
c and restricting it to the scope of P and Q.
The system on the right hand side consists of also three processes, Alice, Bob and S ys. Alice
generates a fresh channel ch and sends it over the public channel pub, afterwards awaiting for
an input on channel ch. Bob waits for an input on the public channel and will then output on
the received name the name data. This example clearly illustrates the scope extrusion feature.
Alice starts off with the fresh name ch restricted to its scope and then extrudes the scope of ch
by sending it over the public channel.
Even in these simples examples we can observe a limitation of pi-calculus from a security
perspective: Processes P and Q are communicating over a channel that is inaccessible by any
other process (namely by attackers), therefore any communications through c are guaranteed to
be secure, and as long as neither P or Q send the channel to any other process, one can argue
that even authentication is guaranteed. On the right hand side example, after Alice successfully
sends the new channel to Bob we can be sure that no other process can intercept communications
over the channel, establishing secrecy and integrity of communications.
Such scenarios are unrealistic, in the sense that one cannot expect that two processes com-
municate through a channel that only they can access, at least not without some previously
ran protocol that establishes the security of the channel over which to communicate. Hence,
from a security protocol analysis perspective, modelling secure communication channels with
restricted names is not realistic.
A naive attempt would be to use messages over an open channel to represent the establish-
ment of the security of the channel, this approach however is fairly indirect. A more suitable
approach would be to use an open channel, and use an encoding of encryption techniques to es-
tablish the security of the channel. Such an encoding in the pi-calculus, however, is too intricate
for practical use. Some of the calculi presented in future sections (2.2.3,2.2.4) will introduce
ways to circumvent these issues.
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P,Q F . . .
| case L of {n}K in P (Decryption)
α F . . .
| m〈{n}K〉 (Encrypted Output)
Figure 2.3: The Spi-calculus Cryptographic Extensions
A , c〈{M}K〉
B , c(x).case x of {y}K in Op(y)
S ys , (νK)(A | B)
Figure 2.4: Spi-calculus Example
2.2.3 Spi-calculus
While the pi-calculus does indeed have great expressive power, its foundational and minimality
goals often result in many features of distributed protocols being very hard to appropriately
encode: such as encryption and decryption of data, or more generally, arbitrary operations on
values.
The possibility of reasoning about distributed protocols that use such features, namely secu-
rity protocols, using process calculi is an appealing prospect. Despite the number of notations
that exist to specify security protocols, they are either too implementation orientated [49], not
providing a precise way of reasoning about the protocol itself, or, in spite of being more for-
mal [10] are too unrelated of the operational details of the protocol itself. Therefore, due to
the somewhat high-level implementational nature of process descriptions in process calculi, ex-
pressing security protocols using process calculi would provide an interesting neutral ground.
As such, Abadi and Gordon introduced the Spi Calculus [3]. The Spi Calculus is an ex-
tension of the pi-calculus with cryptographic primitives (these primitives are shown in Figure
2.3), aimed at the description and analysis of security protocols. In essence, the calculus builds
on [48, 47] by adding numbers and pairs to the possible values of the language, as well as the
possibility to encrypt and decrypt such values and transmit them over channels. The encryp-
tion operation simply cyphers the value n with key K, whilst the decryption operations takes a
value L and binds the decrypted contents to n by performing a decryption using key K. Using
this calculus we can model protocols such as the one in Fig. 2.4. In this protocol, principal A
encrypts the message M with key K and sends it over channel c. B receives the message and
performs a decryption with the appropriate key, proceeding to perform some operation Op on
the decrypted value y.
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The fundamental aspect of this calculus is the usage of restriction and scope extrusion to
represent fresh secrets or values and the sharing of secrets, respectively, in order to accurately
model security protocols (this representation interestingly coincides with the Dolev-Yao model
of [29]); and of observational equivalencies to model security and integrity properties, therefore
focusing on an observational view of the protocol, related to what an attacker can observe (or
know) from the running protocol as a whole.
As mentioned, Abadi and Gordon express security and integrity guarantees through obser-
vational equivalence. Essentially, if a run of a protocol with secret D cannot be distinguished
from a run of the protocol with secret data D′ (for any D′) - both runs are observationally
equivalent - then D is kept safe by the protocol. The idea is that the “observer” is an implicit
representation of an attacker that can interact with the protocol.
The spi calculus presents itself as a process calculus for reasoning about security proto-
cols, using observational equivalence to model security and integrity properties. This approach
therefore focuses (indirectly) on the knowledge obtainable by the environment (an arbitrary at-
tacker), and it’s ability to discriminate this knowledge in different runs of the protocol, keeping
the representation of the attacker implicit in the model. Some limitations of this approach lie in
the global view of the protocol, which may be interesting for security and integrity, but not as
much in the compositional correctness of the protocol itself, since it doesn’t allow for composi-
tional reasoning. Also, the described observational equivalence isn’t clearly defined and may be
very hard to prove, since it considers arbitrary terms. A more technical yet important limitation
resides on the limited set of cryptographic operations, which limits the scope of analysable pro-
tocols. Another possible limitation resides in the fact that while the attacker is mentioned as an
arbitrary spi calculus process, it’s implicit representation introduces a degree of heterogeneity
in the model, since it treats attackers in a special way.
Despite its limitations, the spi calculus provides an interesting framework in which to study
and reason about security protocols, using key features of the pi-calculus (name restriction and
scope extrusion), combined with operations on values relevant to the domain, and with obser-
vational equivalence techniques that represent security and integrity property verification, in
respect to an interfering attacker. This thesis, although not focusing on process equivalence
techniques, shares some of the spi calculus approach to protocol modelling (although closer to
the calculus of section 2.2.4), in the sense that it also uses restriction to represent fresh values
such as nonces, or secret values like keys.
Many of the ideas presented in the spi calculus have been used (adapted) in the cryptographic
protocol verification tools Proverif by Blanchet [7] and more directly in STA by Boreale [9],
where given a model of a protocol using a language similar to the spi calculus, its possible to
express and verify properties in terms of traces generated by the protocol.
2.2.4 Applied pi-calculus
The Spi-calculus, presented in the previous section, builds upon the pi-calculus by extending
it with cryptographic primitives, in order to provide a precise framework for reasoning about
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Σ , {enc,dec}
E , {dec(enc(x,y),y) = x}
Figure 2.5: Equational Theory and Signature
security protocols. However, one of the downsides of [3] is that it provides a limited set of
cryptographic operations. Essentially, for each choice of cryptographic primitives, both calculus
and proof techniques need to be crafted, therefore limiting the kinds of protocols that can be
expressed and analysed with the calculus.
In [2], Abadi and Fournet present the applied pi-calculus. This calculus, typically used for
reasoning about security, provides a general extension of the standard pi-calculus by introducing
functions, value passing and equations among terms, therefore bypassing the limitation of [3]
in respect to the cryptographic primitives. Much like how the spi calculus allows for encrypted
values to be transmitted over channels, the applied pi-calculus allows for values constructed
with names and functions to be transmitted. These functions are defined through signatures. A
signature is a finite set of function symbols, that is then equipped with an equivalence relation
on terms that is used to test for term equality. This equivalence relation can be generated
from sets of equational axioms or rewrite rules. In essence, it is this feature of the applied
pi-calculus that gives it it’s generic qualities, seeing as one can now imbue arbitrary functions
and their semantics in the calculus. For instance, with the signature Σ and equational theory E
from Figure 2.5, we define symmetric encryption (with function symbol enc) and decryption
(function symbol dec). The semantic of decryption is defined by the equation, that states that
decrypting a value with the correct key succeeds in producing the encrypted value.
Another novel construct of [2] is that of an active substitution, which is essentially a per-
sisting substitution that any process can apply. This is used in the calculus to capture the partial
knowledge an environment may have on values. For example, a process upon outputting a term
through a channel “creates” an active substitution that expresses this information. A set of these
substitutions is called a frame, and therefore captures a chunk of partial knowledge an envi-
ronment may have. Interestingly, Abadi and Cortier show in [1] that deduction from frames
(the problem of whether a term is deducible from the knowledge of a frame and the equational
theory) is decidable for a class of equational theories identified as subterm convergent. This
class of equational theories imposes some restrictions on the types of functions that can be de-
fined, but are rich enough to express a great deal of functions used in security protocols. The
result obtained in [1] is relevant because it validates the possibility of reasoning about security
protocols using knowledge (exposed or otherwise).
In [3], observational equivalence is used as a tool to capture authenticity and secrecy prop-
erties. Following the intent of the development of a solid proof theory in which to reason about
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P(k,msg) , let x = enc(msg,k) in ch〈x〉.ch(z).let y = dec(z,k) in P(k,msg)
Q(k,ack) , ch(y).let m = dec(y,k) in let r = enc(ack,k) in ch〈r〉.Q(k,ack)
R , (ν k)(P(k,msg) | Q(k,ack))
Figure 2.6: Example Using Encryption
(applied pi) processes, Abadi and Fournet develop several equivalencies and proof techniques
for the applied pi-calculus, namely observational equivalence, which reflects indistinguishabil-
ity in regard to actions; static equivalence, which reflects indistinguishability of substitutions,
in the sense that the processes deal with equal terms under the equational theory; and (labeled)
bisimilarity, which is defined as standard bisimilarities but requires static equivalence to hold
(to embody the equalities of the equational theory), and proved to coincide with observational
equivalence.
The applied pi-calculus, given its generic nature and comprehensive equivalence and proof
techniques, provides an almost foundational calculus in which to reason about security proto-
cols, since it consists of a pi-calculus that can represent (rather than encode) any operations that
the protocol may require in an homogeneous fashion, all the while maintaining high-level and
precise reasoning. These characteristics were the paramount source of inspiration to the calcu-
lus used in this thesis, seeing as the goal was to use a calculus expressive and rich enough to
express any protocol. Therefore, choosing a calculus much like the applied pi-calculus seems a
natural choice.
2.2.4.1 A Brief Example Redux
In figure 2.6, the example presented in section 2.2.2.1, Fig. 2.2 (left hand side) is reformulated
using a language much like the applied pi-calculus (we add the let declaration for readability).
The idea is that instead of using a restricted channel, an open channel will be used. We will also
employ symmetric cryptography, as defined by the signature and equational theory of Fig. 2.5.
In this case, encryption is used to ensure secrecy - since only P and Q know the key k, only
they can decrypt the exchanged messages - and authenticity, in the sense that since only P and
Q know the key k, then only they can generate messages encrypted with such a key. In such
a simple example, it’s fairly evident that both the properties hold. However, in more complex
examples (which are usually the ones of interest), some proof techniques must be used: either
using process equivalencies or logics.
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P |= T , >
P |= ¬A , not P |= A
P |= A∧B , P |= A and P |= B
P |= 〈α〉A , ∃Q.P α→ Q and Q |= A
Figure 2.7: Hennesy Milner Logic
P , c〈〉.v〈〉.0
P |= 〈c〉〈v〉T
P |= ¬〈v〉T
Figure 2.8: HML Example
2.2.5 Behavioural Logics
2.2.5.1 Hennessy-Milner Logic
Together with CCS, Milner and Hennessy presented a logic known as Hennessy-Milner Logic
(HML) [35]. HML is a modal logic that can be used to specify temporal properties of CCS
processes. HML consists of the standard minimal boolean connectives together with a temporal
modality (known as diamond). This temporal connective expresses the possibility of a process
performing an action and resulting in a process that satisfies some HML formula. The syntax
and semantics for HML are presented in Figure 2.7. The boolean connectives are interpreted
standardly. Formulas with the diamond modality are satisfied by processes that can perform
action α and whose continuations satisfy formula A.
In essence, HML is a behavioural logic, in the sense that it can reason about the behaviour
(through actions) of CCS processes. For instance, as shown in Fig. 2.8, given a process P that
first outputs on channel c and then outputs on channel v, we can define such behaviour with the
first HML formula. This formula states that after performing the action over channel c, one of
the possible resulting processes (in this case there is only one possibility) can perform an action
on v. We can also state that P cannot perform actions on v from the start, which is done through
the second formula.
A fundamental result of this work is that the logical equivalence induced by HML coincides
with the notion of bisimulation presented earlier, that is, two processes satisfy the same set of
HML formulas if, and only if, they are bisimilar. This characterisation result is of great impor-
tance from an analysis perspective, and provides much insight on the discriminating power of
HML. In fact, logical characterisation results give a precise notion of the expressivity of logics,
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in terms of on what level they can distinguish processes.
Using HML we can express properties of process behaviour and then check that the formulas
hold in a given CCS model. If that is the case, then we can be sure that in all processes that
are bisimilar to it (that observably behave in the same way) the properties will also hold. This
feature induces a verification pattern based on properties that can (or not) be combined with the
implementation/specification verification pattern mentioned previously, that uses processes as a
specification.
In specification-based analysis where the specification is expressed through a process, usu-
ally there exists a great deal of precision in the sense that only a single model exists for the given
specification. However, verification is more often based on the necessity that certain high-level
behavioural properties hold in a system. Therefore, a logical (higher level) view of the specifi-
cation through a set of properties becomes very natural. One just needs to state the behavioural
properties in HML formulas and then check if the formulas hold in the CCS process that models
the system. This property based approach coincides with the one pursued in this thesis.
Additionally, due to the logical characterisation result mentioned earlier, one can perform
these analyses on the specification of the system and assure that on all correct implementations
of the system (i.e. implementations that are bisimilar to the specification), the properties will
also hold. This analysis pattern allows a greater degree of flexibility in the ways of verifying
system correctness.
2.2.5.2 Logics of Behaviour for the pi-calculus
As mentioned previously, a logical approach to specifications provides a more abstract and
higher-level reasoning about process properties then that of process equivalencies. Such a logic
characterisation of process behaviour also exists for the pi-calculus, using modal logics which
very frequently are variants of HML ([46] by Milner, Parrow and Walker), adapted for the pi-
calculus. In essence, the fundamental intent of these logics is to specify processes up to bisim-
ilarity, that is, to have the logical equivalence (satisfaction of the exact same set of formulas)
of processes coincide with bisimilarity, not only to bridge both approaches on process analysis
(none providing a greater discriminating power), but also to provide a framework equivalent to
that described for CCS.
Another interesting set of logics combine variants of HML and [46] with the modal µ-
calculus [40], which is a calculus of fixed point operators. These logics (such as [23], proposed
by Dam) allow the expressing of properties using co-induction, which allows the description of
a system by dividing it into simpler sub-systems. For example, liveness properties (“a system
can always perform some operation”) can be cleanly defined in this manner.
These logics, although having the same discriminatory power of bisimilarities, aim at pro-
viding a higher level view of properties that relate more directly to the behavioural aspect of
systems, because specifications using logical properties generally have more models than those
using process descriptions. This high level approach is one of the key aspects of this disserta-
tion, that despite of using a process calculus model is more concerned with providing ways to
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express and verify properties of protocols.
2.2.6 Spatial Logics
Despite the expressive power of the behavioural logics presented thus far, the types of prop-
erties they can express are somewhat limited to the pure behaviour of systems. For instance,
behavioural logics cannot reason about messages exchanged inside a closed system, since their
observational power is limited to the external (observable) actions. Additionally, from a dis-
tributed system perspective, it’s interesting to reason about properties related to resource usage
in general, for example to state properties of race freedom - absence of simultaneous consump-
tion of a resource in an uncontrolled way. Also, to verify the correctness of a distributed system,
one has to consider the several (abstract or concrete) locations inside the system itself, instead
of simply considering the interactions of the system with its environment. This lack of expres-
siveness has motivated the development of a new class of logics: dynamic spatial logics for
concurrent and distributed system analysis.
Dynamic spatial logics [12], instead of limiting their observational power to the labelled
action dynamics of systems (states as nodes in a labelled graph or tree where transitions take
place over time), explore structures where the states not only evolve in time, but possess an
internal spatial arrangement that can be accessed through the spatial connectives [16]. While
many spatial structures can be conceived, the structure usually considered in the scope of dis-
tributed system analysis, using process calculi, is to interpret a system as a set of “threads” (this
set is constructed by the static operators of the calculus such as parallel composition in [48, 47])
that can be bound together using name restriction.
A spatial behavioural logic, in addition to a set of behavioural modalities (usually similar
to those of HML), possesses a set of spatial operators that relate to the static operators of the
process calculus for which the logic is intended [19, 13, 14]. In the case of the pi-calculus (the
calculus that serves as a starting point for this thesis’ work), the static operators usually consid-
ered are the parallel composition operator (P | Q), the null process 0 and name restriction (νn)P.
The logical counterpart of these operators (as defined in [13, 14] by Caires and Cardelli) are the
composition formula A | B, which holds in a process that can be separated into two processes in
parallel, one satisfying A and the other satisfying B; the void formula 0, that holds in the void
process; and the hidden name quantifier Hx.A that allows quantification over restricted names
- such a formula holds in a process that has an hidden name such that the formula A holds (in-
stantiating the name variable x in A with the hidden name in the process). A core spatial logic
with these connectives is presented in Figure 2.9 (we denote by f n(P) the set of free names of
process P). Notice that the semantics of the logic make use of the structural congruence relation
≡ to inspect the structure of the models.
With our core spatial logic we can express interesting properties of the spatial dynamics
of processes. For example, we can state that a process P is composed of two non-void sub-
processes (Fig. 2.10 - top) or we can state that a process is composed of two non-void sub-
processes under a name restriction (Fig. 2.10 - bottom).
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P |= T , >
P |= ¬A , not P |= A
P |= 0 , P ≡ 0
P |= A | B , P ≡ Q | R and Q |= A and R |= B
P |= Hx.A , P ≡ (νn)Q and Q |= A{x← n}
P |= @n , n ∈ f n(P)
Figure 2.9: A Core Spatial Logic
P |= (¬0 | ¬0)
P |= Hx.(¬0 | ¬0)
Figure 2.10: Spatial Properties
The combination of the previously described spatial operators with a name occurrence pred-
icate, recursion, propositional operators and behavioural modalities (like those of [23] by Dam)
gives rise to what can be seen as a basic spatial behavioural logic expressive enough to rea-
son about distributed systems in respect to properties that relate to resource usage or internal
behaviour. Examples of such properties are presented in section 2.2.6.4, based on the running
example presented previously.
2.2.6.1 Local Reasoning with Spatial Logics
One of the most important aspects of (dynamic) spatial logics is that they enable local reasoning
about complex systems. Instead of just approaching a system as a whole, one can also reason
about a system by dividing it into smaller sub-components and reasoning separately about them,
which is a much more interesting approach when analysing distributed systems (and protocols),
since generally one is not only interested in the behaviour of the system in its entirety but also of
the various parts that make up the system itself. Local reasoning is achieved by a combination
of spatial connectives such as the parallel composition formula, the hidden name quantifier, a
name occurrence predicate and fix-point recursion. The parallel composition formula separates
various sub-components of the system to be analysed, while the hidden name quantifier, the
name occurrence predicate and recursion can be combined to “open” a system, by lifting all re-
stricted names and allowing reasoning about the internals of the system. This lifting is achieved
by successively quantifying over the hidden names of the system, until no other hidden names
can be quantified and therefore the system has been completely “opened”. One can then use the
parallel composition formula to navigate the internal spatial substructure of the system. With
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this framework one can then write properties such as unique handling: by stating that internally,
there never exists a configuration of the system where two of it’s subsystems attempt to read
simultaneously off the same channel; race freedom: by stating that there never exists an internal
configuration of the system where more then one subsystem outputs on the same channel (that
in turn is being read by some subsystem).
Spatial logics also allow one to count the number of components of a system by reasoning
about the impossibility of dividing the system in a specific number of non-void components.
This technique can be used to reason about more general properties of the components of a
system: one can state that all components in the system satisfy some property, or that a certain
set of components satisfies some property.
Another interesting feature of spatial logics is their adequacy in expressing contextual tests.
In many process calculi, there exist notions of arbitrary contextual tests, since they provide
a uniform and general approach to behavioural specifications and observational equivalencies
- by stating the behaviour of processes i.r.t any context in which it can exist. In spatial logics
there’s a logical primitive that expresses the concept of contextual test, coined as the “guarantee”
operator in [14]. Used as A B B, this formula holds in a process P if, for every process Q that
satisfies A, the parallel composition of P and Q satisfies B.
To some extent, one can even reason about secrecy using classic spatial logics, in the sense
that it is possible to state that a process will never leak private (restricted) names on public
channels, by using hidden name quantification. However, one should note that the pi-calculus
isn’t the best calculus for analysing systems or protocols designed for security, thus when using
a more security-friendly calculus such as those discussed in sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4, secrecy
cannot be interpreted in such a naive way. In a scenario where a process holds some private
name, it may send it through an open channel and not leak it if the output is safely encrypted,
that is, it outputs a cyphered message that contains the private name and the cypher key is not
known by undesired third parties. Also, it may be possible to output a private name by encasing
it in an encrypted message that can be deciphered by attackers sometime in the future, that is,
the attacker eventually obtains the key that was used to cypher the initial message.
This argument shows that while dynamic spatial logics (in this case for the pi-calculus) in-
deed provide a powerful framework for reasoning about distributed systems in general, they are
somewhat ill-equipped to realistically reason about security since they cannot (and were not
intended to) reason about composite terms such as cyphered messages, which can encapsulate
and expose information depending on the information held by the receiver of a message. There-
fore, some extensions need be made to address security properties, when dealing with security-
oriented calculi such as [3] or [2]. In [30], Lozes and Villard present a spatial equational logic
designed for the applied pi-calculus. The logic is an extension of first order equational logic
with spatial connectives. The underlying idea is that term equality is defined from both the
equational theory under consideration and local axioms from applied pi-calculus frames. This
logic, while having similar goals as the one in this thesis, does not deal with the concept of
“knowledge” of a process, therefore being a somewhat alternate approach to fundamentally the
same problem.
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While the discussion of spatial logics thus far has only presented the hidden name quanti-
fier and a name occurrence predicate as a way of reasoning about restricted names, there exist
alternative spatial operators able to express such properties, as proposed in [19] by Cardelli and
Gordon. Such operators are the revelation operator, written as x®A, that holds in processes
that have a restricted name x and it’s underlying process satisfies A; and the freshness quantifier
Nx.A, which quantifies over fresh names. Interestingly, the hidden name quantification can be
expressed by combining the freshness quantifier with the revelation operator, and the name oc-
currence predicate can be expressed by the revelation operator alone. Conversely, the freshness
quantifier and revelation operators can be expressed using name occurrence and hidden name
quantification. Its even possible to define validity and entailment within the logic itself using
the guarantee operator [19]. In [13, 14], Caires and Cardelli develop in great detail the proof
theory and meta-theoretic properties of a spatial logic for the pi-calculus, including a sequent
calculus formulation of a (sound) proof system for the logic.
2.2.6.2 Expressiveness and Decidability
The aim of spatial logics is to give a greater degree of expressiveness than classical behavioural
logics, essentially allowing to analyse processes in more detail. There exists much work regard-
ing the expressiveness of spatial logics, in the sense of what exactly is their separation power
for the model which they are designed for, or what equivalence on processes does the logical
equivalence induce.
In [11], Caires concludes that the separating power of a dynamic spatial logic (with action
modalities, fix-point iteration, fresh quantification and revelation) lies between structural con-
gruence and strong bisimilarity, that is, its finer than bisimilarity and coarser than structural
congruence. In fact, a logic characterisation of bisimilarity in the finite pi-calculus was devel-
oped in [36] by Hirschkoff, using a spatial logic without parallel composition but with name
occurrence and the guarantee operator, used as a contextual testing primitive. Other characteri-
sation results of spatial logics have been developed, such as [17] by Caires and Vieira, regarding
extensional observational equivalencies.
Relevant to the study of the expressiveness of the logics is the study of the decidability
of model and validity checking. Given the expressiveness of spatial logics, it’s expected that
many of the decidability results come out negative, as shown in [21] by Charatonik and Talbot,
where both model-checking and validity of pure spatial logics (without behavioural modalities
and with the guarantee operator and universal quantifiers over names) are proved undecidable.
However, Calcagno, Cardelli and Gordon show in [18] that the static fragment of spatial logics
(the void, parallel and guarantee operators) is decidable, although with a very high complexity.
In an important result by Ghelli and Conforti [33], it is shown that the source of undecidability
is the revelation operator, while the static spatial operators with the freshness quantifier remain
decidable. Following [33], it was proved by Caires and Lozes that dynamic spatial logics, in the
presence of the guarantee operator (which adds to the expressiveness of the logic to the extent
that it cannot be removed), are essentially undecidable [15].
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As described, spatial logics, given their high degree of expressiveness, are undecidable and
incomplete in general. However, spatial behavioural logics without the guarantee operator re-
main very expressive and useful from a verification point of view (the presentation in section
2.2.6.1 for instance), and it’s shown in [11] that the model-checking problem is decidable and
complete for bounded processes, which includes the class of processes with finite control (finite
state space).
2.2.6.3 The Spatial Logic Model Checker
The initial version of the Spatial Logic Model Checker [60] consists of a model-checking tool
for a spatial behavioural logic [11] for the pi-calculus. Its algorithm is both sound and complete
for bounded processes (a process whose set of reachable processes after an arbitrary sequence
of spatial/behavioural observations is finite). The syntax of the tool is similar to that of the pi-
calculus and of standard spatial-behavioural logics, although with some syntactic enrichments
to provide a simpler use.
In this thesis, the tool has been extended with support for term communication (terms are
values built from application of symbolic functions to names), and the ability to reason about the
knowledge of a process. In this context, knowledge is interpreted as the set of terms a process
holds, as well as those it can derive from them.
2.2.6.4 An Example with Spatial Logics
Considering the initial (and very simple) example of Figure 2.2, it’s interesting to see what
kinds of spatial properties one can write, despite their triviality. For instance, we can state that
the process R is composed of two distinct sub-components under a hidden name:
R |= Hx.( 1 | 1 )
With:
1 , ¬0∧¬(¬0 | ¬0)
We can also state that R is composed of two sub-components, one that has a name msg and sends
it to the other (which can be expressed by the HML behavioural modality 〈x〉φ - “its possible to
perform action x and after that φ holds”), and the other that has a name ack and sends it to the
other:
R |= Hx.( 1∧@msg∧〈x〈msg〉〉> | 1∧@ack∧〈x()〉〈x〈ack〉〉> )
And more generally, we may want to state that R never opens the private communication chan-
nel. This notion of invariant property is embodied by the φ connective that combines fix point
iteration with the dual of diamond - “in every reachable state, φ holds”:
NoLeak ,¬∃p.Hx.〈p〈x〉〉>
R |= NoLeak
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These example properties show some of the expressive power of dynamic spatial logics. Al-
though, considering the modified example of Figure 2.6, where instead of using a private chan-
nel, communications take place over a public channel using cyphered messages, the NoLeak
property wouldn’t have its intended meaning, since one could easily conceive an example where
NoLeak holds, yet a private name is still leaked:
S , ((νpvt) let x = f (pvt) in ch〈x〉) | ch(y).let z = f −1(y) in . . .
The process on the left-hand side of the composition has a private name pvt and outputs the
result of applying some function f to pvt over a channel. The right-hand side process simply
inputs over the channel and applies the reverse function f −1 on the received message, therefore
obtaining pvt. Despite this, formula NoLeak holds in S , since it never directly outputs pvt over
the channel. This counter-example clearly shows that great care is needed when considering
spatial logics for process calculi that allow actions like function application.
As previously mentioned in Section 2.2.6.3, in the development of this thesis the SLMC
tool has been modified at the model and the logic level, however, we present in Fig. 2.11 the
original example of Figure 2.2 using the SLMC syntax without any of the new features. The
SLMC tool provides a few syntactical facilities to ease the writing of properties, such as the
inside predicate, which lifts all restricted names of a process; the 1 predicate, which holds if a
process is composed of a single “thread” (the SLMC implements a more generic k predicate,
which holds in a process that is composed of k threads); the always A predicate, which is an
implementation of the  modal operator combined with fix-point iteration, which holds in a
system where A is true in every possible step; and the eventually A predicate, which holds in a
system where A is true in a possible step of its execution.
In the process definitions, the new construct defines restricted names; an output through a
channel is written channel!(x1, . . . , xn), with x1, . . . , xn being the names to be output ; and inputs
are written channel?(x1, . . . , xn), with x1, . . . , xn being the variables over which the input will be
read.
2.2.7 Epistemic Logics
The several logics presented up to this point deal specifically with notions of behaviour and
spatial dynamics of their intended models. However, some security properties aren’t naturally
expressed solely as a function of the behaviour or the spatial dynamics of principals, as argued
in Section 2.2.6.4. As such, there has been an effort to use different types of logics to reason
about security properties in a more direct fashion. Specifically, epistemic logics, or logics of
knowledge and belief, have been used to reason about security since many security properties
can be understood as a function of the knowledge, or beliefs, of the principals involved in a
protocol.
The idea of using knowledge follows naturally from the fact that fundamental properties of
security are essentially properties of knowledge. Authenticity, for instance, can be understood
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defproc P(ch) = ch!(msg).ch?(x);;
defproc Q(ch) = ch?(y).ch!(ack);;
defproc R = new c in (P(c) | Q(c));;
defprop noLeak = always not exists p.hidden x.<p!(x)> true;;
defprop twoComp = inside (1 | 1);;
defprop behaviorR = hidden x.(
(1 and @msg and <x!(msg)> true) |
(1 and @ack and <x?><x!(ack)> true));;
check R |= noLeak;;
check R |= twoComp;;
check R |= behaviorR;;
Figure 2.11: Example for the SLMC
as knowing the sender of a message, anonymity can be read as not knowing the sender of a
message, among other properties.
With this view of security in mind, BAN logic [10] was introduced. This logic, although
lacking clearly and precisely defined semantics, deals in assertions of the belief of agents in
a protocol. Another potential flaw of BAN (or other purely epistemic approaches [22]) is that
modelling protocols using epistemic-based approaches is a non-trivial feat, essentially because
logics are geared for specifying properties instead of operational steps of protocols. Considering
this weakness of more classically based epistemic frameworks, several authors have proposed
hybrid frameworks that model protocols using process calculi and reason about properties using
epistemic modalities.
In [24], a temporal-epistemic logic is introduced over a CCS-like process calculus, with
sequential and parallel composition, but with an epistemic flavour where actions can be tagged
with the identities of the principals who observe them. The logic itself is a variant of the µ-
calculus with epistemic modalities and past. In this logic, the standard “knows” modality is
instantiated with the identity of the agent whose knowledge one wishes to verify. For instance,
to state that agent i knows ϕ we would state Kiϕ, which would essentially range over all states
considered possible by agent i - hence the action tagging of the calculus. This framework,
although much closer to a pure operational approach, still has the issue of the calculus having
explicit information over which agents observe what actions, which from a purely operational
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perspective isn’t a very natural interpretation of the operational definition of a protocol.
In a very recent development however, [20] introduces an epistemic logic for the applied
pi-calculus of Section 2.2.4, without replication. This logic has some similarities to the one
developed in this thesis, in the sense that it has modalities to reason about terms. These modal-
ities, however, are fundamentally different. The logic is separated in three types of formulas:
term denotations, static formulas and epistemic formulas. Term denotations are logical repre-
sentation of applied-pi terms; static formulas consist of first order quantification, disjunction,
negation and a predicate that can be used to reason about the set of terms the intruder possesses;
finally, the epistemic formulas consist of past and future operators, and an epistemic knowledge
(from the intruder point of view) operator. The epistemic component of the logic is interpreted
over the set of all possible runs of a protocol, using a notion of maximal trace of a process -
which coincides with all possible runs because the model lacks replication. This approach is
essentially based in the intruder point of view, and interprets epistemic properties as properties
of all the runs of a protocol (therefore being limited to finite traces).
Its interesting to see the contrast of this framework with the one presented in this thesis, since
both are introduced at similar dates. Here we focus on static knowledge from the perspective
of the principal instead of the attacker (allowing reasoning about the internal behaviour of the
protocol at the “expense” of explicit attacker modelling), and combine this view of knowledge
with spatial and behavioural modalities, therefore allowing compositional reasoning about the
knowledge of the several principals (and attackers), over time and space. These differences re-
sult in fundamentally different work from that of [20], in the sense that their somewhat opposite
perspective requires an equally opposite formal treatment, closely related to static equivalence
of processes and of traces.
3 . A Logic for Local Knowledge Reasoning
In this chapter we present the bulk of the work developed during the course of this thesis.
We begin by motivating the model that underlies our logic, followed by its syntax and some
necessary term theory, as well as the calculus’ formal semantics.
We then step into our logic, presenting the syntax and denotational semantics for the core
spatial-behavioural logic extended with the new term (epistemic) modalities. We follow by
presenting some useful derived idioms, and we present some ways of stating some interesting
properties from a security perspective.
Following the logic, we present our theory of the computational capabilities of principals
and attackers in a sequent calculus formulation and present some important theoretical results
that aim to validate the approach. We begin by showing that the sequent calculus formulation
is sound in respect to the ability to derive new information from terms (through reduction and
function application), present in the semantics of the logic. We then present a sound, com-
plete and decidable procedure of calculating an approximation of the full (infinite) derivable
knowledge of a process and we prove the sequent calculus to be complete in respect to this
approximation. Through this result we are then able to prove the completeness of the sequent
calculus in respect to the full derivable knowledge of processes. Thus proving our formal theory
to be both sound and complete.
Finally, we present the extensions implemented in the SLMC tool and show how the previ-
ous proofs provide a way to algorithmically determine if a term (or set of terms) can be derived
from an initial set of terms.
3.1 Model
As mentioned in previous sections, we need a model that, while preserving abstraction, is ex-
pressive enough to model security protocols with a high-level of operational detail, since that is
the most straightforward way of modeling a protocol. As argued in Section 2.2.2.1, despite the
Turing completeness of the pi-calculus, encoding cryptographic operations in it would be cum-
bersome and too complex, therefore we follow an approach that is somewhat a hybrid between
the Spi-calculus [3] and the Applied pi-calculus. The idea is that we want a calculus that has
the expressiveness of pi but where we can easily model and use cryptographic operations such
as symmetric and asymmetric encryption and hashing, in order to model the several principals
and adversaries of a protocol as processes in the calculus. We therefore take the pi-calculus and
extend it with the capacity to communicate arbitrary structured terms (built from the applica-
tion of function symbols to names), defined by a term algebra. These terms symbolically model
the necessary cryptographic operations. We refrain from using some of the technical aspects
(such as frames) of the Applied pi-calculus due to simplicity, and because we aren’t exploring
the equivalencies induced by the semantics of the calculus. To define the semantics of cryptog-
raphy, we use a signature, which is a set of function symbols equipped with an arity, and a set
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of equations (or rewrite rules) that describe how we can perform operations on terms. Follow-
ing [1], we impose some restrictions on the form of the equations that can be used, to ensure
decidability.
We now present the syntax of our process calculus. In the construct for recursion we require
all occurrences of process variables to be guarded by an action. In the choice construct we
require both choice components to also be guarded by an action.
3.1.1 Syntax
Definition 3.1.1. (Processes). Given a set of function symbols Σ called a signature, an infinite
set of names Λ such that m ∈ Λ and n ∈ Λ, a set χ of process variables X, the set of processes
(P,Q), of actions α, of terms M are defined by:
P,Q F 0 (Null process)
| P|Q (Parallel composition)
| (νn)P (Name restriction)
| α.P (Action prefix)
| P + Q (Choice)
| let n = M in P (Let construct)
| (rec X.P) (Recursive definition)
| X (Process variable)
α F m(x) (Input action)
| m〈M〉 (Output action)
| [M1 = M2] (Test)
| m〈∗〉 (Attacker output)
M F n (Name)
| f (M1, . . . ,Ma) (Function application)
where the function symbol f ranges over functions in Σ and a matches the arity of f .
The syntax uses constructs commonly used in process calculi, in particular its very close to
the syntax of the Spi-calculus and the Applied pi-calculus. The key features of the calculus lie
in the usage of structured terms as messages and explicit attacker representations. The latter
is achieved through the Attacker output construct which is a non-deterministic output of any
message that a process can know.
Since the usage of these terms intends to model cryptographic operations, we need to be
able to define how to transform a term into another term. These transformations allow us to
represent decryption, hashing, pairing, or other useful and necessary operations.
To achieve this, we define an equivalence relation =E on terms that represents semantic
equality of terms. Such a relation can be generated from a set E of equations. Each equation
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E1 , {dec(enc(x,y),y) = x;pi1(pair(x,y)) = x;pi2(pair(x,y)) = y}
E2 , {dec(enc(x,y),pk(y)) = x;dec(enc(x,pk(y)),y) = x}
Figure 3.1: Equational Theories
has the form M = N where M and N are terms. A finite set of equations is called an equational
theory. We obtain =E by considering the symmetric, reflexive and transitive closure of E. Ad-
ditionally, we impose a constraint on the form of equations we consider, by forcing each N to
be a subterm of M. Such equations may be oriented M → N such that N is a subterm of M.
The motivation for these syntactic restrictions follows from the result of [1], where deduction
for such (convergent) subterm theories was proved decidable.
3.1.2 Equational Theories and Term Rewriting
While the previously mentioned restriction does indeed diminish the kind of operations we can
model, we can still model an interesting set of operations, as show in Figure 3.1, where theory
E1 contains the equations for defining projections on pairs and symmetric cryptography, and
theory E2 contains the equations for asymmetric cryptography.
For further reference, we call the top level function symbol on the left-hand side of an
equation a destructor in the sense that it “destroys” the inner terms to produce the smaller
term on the right-hand side of the equation. Other function symbols are called constructors,
since they allow us to build up new values from names and other terms. For instance, when
considering the equation dec(enc(x,y),pk(y)) = x from theory E2 we have that the function dec
is a destructor and the functions enc and pk are constructors. We denote constructor with the
symbols f ,g,h and destructors with δ.
Given an equational theory, we can assign directions to its equations such that for every
equation t1 = t2 we have t1 → t2. Such a rule is called a rewrite rule in the literature. We
will now introduce some theory on term rewriting, in order to precisely define the notion of
convergence for equational theories.
Definition 3.1.2. (Term Rewriting System). Given a set of rewrite rules generated from an
equational theory E, we call this set a term rewriting system. Generically, given a signature Σ,
a rewrite rule over Σ is a pair of terms (s, t) built from functions in Σ, written s→ t, so that s is
not a variable and the variables of t are a subset of the variables of s.
If R is a term rewriting system over Σ, for two terms v1,v2 we say that v2 has been obtained
by a one-step reduction from v1 using R, written:
v1→R v2
30
If for some rule (s, t) ∈R, v1 can be matched with s and v2 can be matched with t, by instantiating
variables in the rule. We write→∗ as the reflexive, transitive closure of one-step reduction, and
we write =R as the reflexive transitive symmetric closure of one-step redution, and say that s
reduces to t if s→∗ t. We call a term t a normal form in R if there is no term s such that t→ s.
Finally, we say that a term rewriting system R is a term rewriting system for an equational
theory E if for all terms s, t:
s =E t↔ s =R t
We also define a notion of name occurrence on terms, that is helpful in future definitions.
Definition 3.1.3. (Name Occurrence). We denote by names(t) the set of names (not function
symbols) that occur in term t.
We can now introduce the concepts of confluence and strong normalisation necessary for
the convergence property of [1].
Definition 3.1.4. (Confluence). A term rewriting system is confluent if for any terms r, s1, s2
with r→∗ s1 and r→∗ s2 there is a term t such that s1→∗ t and s2→∗ t. For such term rewriting
systems, normal forms are unique if they exist, since if s is a normal form and s→∗ t then s = t.
Definition 3.1.5. (Strong Normalisation). A term rewriting system is strongly normalizing if
there are no infinite sequences of terms such that:
t1→ t2→ . . .
Definition 3.1.6. (Convergence). If a term rewriting system is both strongly normalizing and
confluent, it is complete or convergent.
For more on term rewriting theory, we refer to [5]. Before presenting the operational se-
mantics of the calculus, we define a notion of term depth and functional equational closure of a
set of terms, that will be necessary later on.
Definition 3.1.7. (Depth of a term). We define the maximum nesting depth of a term T, repre-
sented as |T |, as follows:
|n| , 0
| f (t1, . . . , tn)| , 1 + max(|t1|, . . . , |tn|)
Definition 3.1.8. (Functional and Equational Closure). Given a set of terms S and a signature
Σ, we define the functional equational closure of S, F(S ) as follows:
1. S ⊆ F(S )
2. ∀ f ∈ Σ. f a constructor and M1, . . . ,Mk ∈ F(S ) : f (M1, . . . ,Mk) ∈ F(S )
3. ∀δ ∈ Σ.δ a destructor and M1, . . . ,Mk ∈ F(S )∧δ(M1, . . . ,Mk)→ M′⇒ M′ ∈ F(S )
So by F(S ) we refer to the (infinite) set obtained from S by applying functions symbols and
performing reductions. This denotes all the “information” that can be generated from S .
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3.1.3 Operational Semantics
We now introduce the semantics of our process calculus. We begin with two binary relations,
α-congruence and structural congruence. α-congruence ≡α equates processes up to the safe
renaming of bound names. Structural congruence ≡ equates processes with identical structure,
using both term equality =E and the free names of a process f n(P) - names that aren’t bound to
inputs or restrictions. Both relations are auxiliary to the definition of the semantics of processes,
even though structural congruence also plays a role in the semantics of the logic, as will be seen
in Section 3.2.
We will then present the semantics of the calculus in two distinct formulations. We’ll define
reduction semantics, that express how a process can evolve on its own, and we’ll define labelled
transition semantics, that allows us to express how a process can evolve by interacting with its
environment. Note that we defer the semantics of the attacker output to Section 3.1.4.
Definition 3.1.9. (α-congruence). Given a process P and a name p (or set of names p¯):
(νn)P ≡α (νp)P{n← p}
m(x).P ≡α m(p).P{x← p}
let n = M in P ≡α let p = M in P{n← p}
Where p (or p¯) is such that it doesn’t occur in P.
Definition 3.1.10. (Structural congruence). Structural congruence ≡ is the least congruence
relation on processes (P,Q) such that:
P ≡α Q⇒ P ≡ Q
P|0 ≡ P
P|Q ≡ Q|P
P|(Q|R) ≡ (P|Q)|R
P + Q ≡ Q + P
P + (Q + R) ≡ (P + Q) + R
[M1 = M2] .P ≡ [M2 = M1] .P
n < f n(P)⇒ P|(νn)Q ≡ (νn)(P|Q)
(νn)0 ≡ 0
(νn)(νm)P ≡ (νm)(νn)P
M =E M′⇒ let n = M in P ≡ let n = M′ in P
M =E M′⇒ m〈M〉.P ≡ m〈M′〉.P
M1 =E M′1⇒ [M1 = M2].P ≡ [M′1 = M2].P
Our rules for structural congruence are standard in process calculi, with the exception of the
rules that specifically refer to terms. In these cases, similarly to [2], we consider processes to
be structurally equivalent when both manipulate identical terms. This is sensible because there
shouldn’t be a structural distinction between a process that outputs a value x and a process that
outputs dec(enc(x,k),k).
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We can now define the reduction and labelled transition semantics of processes. The reduc-
tion semantics specify under which circumstances a process can perform a computational step,
defining how a process can evolve within itself, in the sense that no interaction with the external
environment is represented.
Definition 3.1.11. (Reduction semantics). The reduction relation P −→ Q over processes is
defined as the least relation closed under the following rules:
M is destructor-free
let n = M in P −→ P{n← M}
y is destructor-free
x〈y〉.P + R | x(z).Q + S −→ P|Q{z← y}
M1 and M2 are destructor-free and M1 =E M2
[M1 = M2] .P −→ P
P −→ Q
P|R −→ Q|R
P −→ Q
(νn)P −→ (νn)Q
P ≡ P′ P′ −→ Q′ Q′ ≡ Q
P −→ Q
Our reduction rules are fairly standard, with the exception of the destructor-freedom condi-
tions of the rule for the let, communication and testing constructs.
The “destructor-free” restrictions are a way of eliminating the ability of processes to com-
municate and handle terms that do not represent concrete values. The idea stems from the
fact that destructors model computational steps that are bounded by some inherent conditions
(defined by the rewrite rules). For instance, a symmetric decryption destructor can only be
correctly applied to a value if the key used to decrypt is the same as the one used to encrypt.
However, nothing forbids a process from trying to perform such an erroneous decryption. In
these scenarios, we have a normal form in the sense that the term cannot be further reduced
(since the destructor equations can’t be fired), but a normal form that does not represent a valid
computation.
To handle these erroneous terms, instead of allowing processes to compute and commu-
nicate these error values amongst each other, we simply halt the progress of processes that
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compute or attempt to communicate such terms. Therefore, computation through the let rule
can only proceed if the declared term can be written through =E as a destructor-free term. In
the rule for communication, the same reasoning is applied. Communication can only proceed
if the communicated term can be written as a destructor-free term. Finally, in the rule for test-
ing, processes can only proceed if both terms to be tested can be written destructor-free. Such
halting on invalid terms can be compared to a program raising an (uncaught) exception when it
detects some computational error. These simple restrictions allow us to ensure that all values
received by a process are valid and don’t represent erroneous computations.
Reduction semantics are sufficient to completely define the operational behaviour of pro-
cesses, but by construction lack the ability to consider how a process can potentially interact
with its environment. Hence, we also present the more general labelled transition semantics
that precisely define how a process can evolve by communicating with its environment, and
subsume the reduction semantics.
The present labelled transition semantics is not intended to characterise a complete notion
of behavioural equivalence (as could be expected), but rather to allow the observation of actions
in our logic. Despite not belonging to the scope of this work, we can point out that our labelled
semantics do not allow for a complete characterisation of equivalent behaviour, in the sense that
our extrusion rules reveal information in such a way that they result in a higher discriminative
power then that of behavioural equivalence. We leave further research on this topic to future
work.
In this labelled transition relation, a transition label α can be a τ, representing the silent
action, an input n(x), an output n〈M〉 or a bound output νx¯.n〈M〉, where x¯ ⊆ names(M).
Definition 3.1.12. (Labelled transition semantics). The labelled transition relation P
α−→ Q is
defined as the least relation closed under the following rules:
P −→ Q
(Tau)
P
τ−→ Q
M is destructor-free (Out)
n〈M〉.P n〈M〉−→ P
M is destructor-free (Inp)
n(x).P
n(M)−→ P
P
α−→ Q ∀n ∈ u¯: n < names(α)
(Res)
(νu¯)P
α−→ (νu¯)Q
P
n〈M〉−→ P′ s¯ ⊆ names(M) and s¯ ⊆ u¯ u¯′ = u¯ \ s¯
(BoundOut)
(νu¯)P
νs¯.n〈M〉−→ (νu¯′)P′
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P ≡ P′ P′ α−→ Q′ Q′ ≡ Q
(Cong)
P
α−→ Q
Again, our labelled semantics are defined with standard rules, with the added destructor-
freedom constraints as in the reduction semantics. The subsumption of reduction is embodied
in the Tau rule, where all reductions are labelled with the τ label. The Out rule allows the
output of valid terms to the environment and the Inp rule allows the input of equally valid
terms. The more complex rules handle restriction: The Res rule allows outputs to proceed if
the term doesn’t mention the restricted names; the BoundOut rule handles output of terms that
contain restricted names by extruding the scope of the necessary restrictions.
3.1.4 Defining Attackers
Using the calculus of the previous sections, we can easily encode passive attackers - an attacker
that only eavesdrops on messages and attempts to perform operations on them. The definition
of the attacker “code” itself must be done on a per-protocol basis, but a general schema can be
defined. These simple attacker models are sufficient, since we can then use our logic to reason
locally about the information the attacker can obtain.
Definition 3.1.13. (Passive Attacker Schema). Given a protocol that exchanges n messages
over channel c, we can define a passive attacker PAttacker for this protocol as:
PAttacker , (ν store)c(x1).c〈x1〉. . . . .c(xn).c〈xn〉.store〈x1, . . . , xn〉
Attackers defined in such a way collect the several messages that are exchanged throughout
a run of the protocol (forwarding them back so the protocol can proceed) and store the messages,
here modeled by the output on channel store. In practice we don’t need to output on a restricted
name, just on a name that isn’t used by the protocol.
While such a process does not perform any operations with the messages themselves, one
could encode such operations in the process itself, or as will be seen in Section 3.2, we can
reason about these operations implicitly.
The calculus can also be extended to model active attackers. This type of attackers not only
eavesdrop on communication that takes place within a protocol but can also inject messages at
any point of the protocol run. These messages can consist of any value obtained by the attacker,
either through past inputs, or by performing computation over past inputs. Since we cannot
statically determine values that will be obtained dynamically by the attacker, we extended the
calculus’ syntax with a new action prefix that models such an output.
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Definition 3.1.14. (Extended Calculus Syntax).
P,Q F . . .
α F . . .
| m〈∗〉 (Attacker Output)
M F . . .
We define the semantics of such an operation through a new structural congruence rule. The
rule allows us to transform the Attacker Output action into a choice, where each choice branch
contains an output of a message that the process can compute.
ti ∈ F(S )⇒ m〈∗〉.P ≡ m〈t1〉.P + · · ·+ m〈tn〉.P
Where S is the set of terms that occur in P that are values. We therefore have a process that
can non-deterministically output any value it can compute. An obvious “practical” problem
with this approach is that the cardinality of the set F(S ) is infinite, therefore an implementation
of such an operation must truncate the number of possible choice branches (as will be seen in
Chapter 4).
With this new operation we can extend our passive attacker schema to implement active
attackers. The idea is that instead of simply forwarding the message back to the protocol, it
performs the new attacker output action, therefore outputting any value it can construct up to
that point.
Definition 3.1.15. (Active AttackerSchema). Given a protocol that exchanges n messages over
channel c, we can define an active attacker AAttacker for this protocol as:
AAttacker , (ν store)c(x1).c〈∗〉. . . . .c(xn).c〈∗〉.store〈x1, . . . , xn〉
3.1.5 Example of a Protocol
We present in Figure 3.2 an example of a simple protocol written in the calculus. Considering an
equational theory consisting of the equation for symmetric cryptography, the protocol consists
of two principals, Alice and Bob, that share a symmetric key and communicate over a public
channel c.
In this toy protocol, the principal Bob generates a session key using the name restriction
operator. Name restriction can be used as name generation, since when we restrict a name to
a certain process we’re stating that such a name is guaranteed to be fresh, in the sense that no
other process can capture it (until the generating process communicates the name). After gen-
erating the key, Bob encrypts it using the key it shares with Alice, and sends it over channel
c. Alice, who is waiting for an input on that channel, reads the cypher-text and then performs
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Alice(k) , c(m).let n = dec(m,k) in c〈enc(hello,n)〉.0
Bob(k) , (ν key)c〈enc(key,k)〉.c?(x). [dec(x,key) = hello] .ok〈〉.0
Attacker , c(x).c〈∗〉.c(y).c〈∗〉.store〈x,y〉.0
System , (ν sharedKey)(Alice(sharedKey) | Bob(sharedKey))
World , System | Attacker
Figure 3.2: A Simple Protocol
a decryption operation on the cypher-text using the shared key. Assuming the decryption suc-
ceeds, Alice proceeds to send, over channel c, the value hello cyphered with the fresh session
key and terminates. Bob will then receive this cypher-text and test if the result of decrypting
the message with the shared key results in the value hello, if it does, it will signal such a fact by
outputting over channel ok and terminating. We can imagine the communication of the value
hello to model the communications that Alice and Bob wanted to assure as secure.
This simple example illustrates the general ideas of how we can use the calculus to model
the standard techniques used in security protocols, such as generating session keys (the same
mechanics apply to nonce generation), pre-determined key sharing, encrypted communication
and performing tests on received data. We also present an active attacker on the protocol,
following the schema of Section 3.1.4. While in this brief example we simply decrypt a value
and test it, we could as easily test the digital signature on a message using an asymmetric
cryptography scheme.
3.2 Logic
Having established our process calculus model of Section 3.1, we can now motivate and intro-
duce our logic. Our goal was to develop a logic with which to reason about security protocols
and their correctness both in the absence and presence of attackers. We therefore needed to have
enough generality to state these correctness properties while considering just the protocol itself
and the protocol combined with attackers.
The idea was to explore some of the key aspects of dynamic spatial logics, such as local and
compositional reasoning, in order to achieve a logic that could reason locally about the several
principals of the protocol as well as reason about the protocol in the presence of attackers. De-
spite this, as motivated in Section 2.2.6.4, these logics were not designed to consider a model
with structured terms like ours. In such a model, properties that strictly refer to names, be it
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name communication or sharing, can become vacuous since they do not consider the vulnerabil-
ities nor the security benefits that the use of cryptography supplies. Also, since we can consider
several equational theories, the denotation of communicating a term that contains a name can
vary.
However, we do want the ability to reason separately about a protocol and its attacker(s). We
may want to verify that the message exchanges in the protocol are valid, without the presence
of attackers, or we may want to verify that the same happens in the presence of attackers, in
the sense that an attacker cannot harmfully tamper with the protocol in such a way that it will
obtain privileged information (like keys), or be able to impersonate a principal.
To achieve this, we propose an extension to a core spatial behavioural logic that enables
reasoning at the term level. The idea is that the information a process can know depends on what
terms it has obtained, or that it can generate. For instance, a process that knows a cypher-text and
doesn’t know the adequate cypher-key can never apply a decryption operation on the cypher-
text to obtain the clear-text, while a process that knows both a cypher-text and the cypher-key
can always obtain (or know) the clear-text.
Therefore, we combine the power of spatial-behavioural logics with the ability to reason
about the information (terms) a process can derive by applying functions and reductions to
terms it already has, coupling the ability to reason about properties of spatial arrangement and
behaviour to the ability to reason about the derivable information modulo the considered equa-
tional theories. Hence allowing us to reason about the spatial and behavioural dynamics of
agents and about the information they can obtain and compute.
Our extension of a spatial behavioural logic (presented in [11]) consists of two logical con-
nectives that deal (epistemically) with terms. The knowledge predicate expresses the fact that a
process either holds the given term in its “code” or it can derive such a term from those it does
hold (by combining the terms through functions). The secret quantifier allows the quantification
over terms that are secret in a process, that is, terms that are unforgeable by other processes.
3.2.1 Syntax
We now introduce the syntax of our logic, followed by its semantics, some derived idioms and
examples of potentially interesting properties.
Definition 3.2.1. (A spatial-behavioral logic with a knowledge modality). Given (A,B) formu-
las, (x,y,z) name variables, X propositional variable (η is a meta-variable that denotes a name
or a name variable), α (action), t (term) and (ϕ,ψ) knowledge formulas we define the syntax of
our logic as presented in Fig. 3.3.
Since we only allow conjunction of knowledge formulas, a knowledge formula can be read
as a denotation of a set of terms, as shown in Definition 3.2.2.
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A,B F T (True)
| η = η′ (Equality)
| ¬A (Negation)
| A∧B (Conjunction)
| 0 (Void)
| A|B (Composition)
| nA (Revelation)
| Nx.A (Fresh quantification)
| ∀x.A (Name quantification)
| α.A (Action)
| X (Propositional variable)
| νX.A (Greatest fixpoint)
| µX.A (Least fixpoint)
| Kϕ (Knowledge)
| Sx.A (Secret quantification)
ϕ,ψ F ϕ∧ψ (Conjunction)
| t (Term)
| > (True)
Figure 3.3: Logic Syntax
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Definition 3.2.2. (Denotation of Knowledge Formulas). We define the denotation of a knowl-
edge formula ϕ, written as [ϕ], inductively on the structure of the formula:
[>] , ∅[
ϕ∧ψ] , [ϕ]∪ [ψ]
[t] , {t}
Informally, our new connectives (knowledge and secret quantification) are interpreted as
follows: a process satisfies Kϕ if it can obtain the terms denoted by ϕ from the terms it pos-
sesses; a process satisfies Sx.A if it possesses a term t that contains a restricted name (a term
that cannot be forged by other processes), where by instantiating the quantified variable x with
the term t, the process satisfies formula A.
3.2.2 Semantics
We will now move towards the semantics of the logic, for which some intermediary definitions
are necessary. Following the presentation of the spatial logics of [14, 11], the semantics are
given in a domain of property sets (Psets). A Pset (Def. 3.2.3) is a set of processes closed
under structural congruence with finite support that represents the set of processes in which
the formula holds. The support of a Pset is a finite set of names such that the Pset is closed
by transposition of names out of the support. The idea is to give a uniform treatment to fresh
names. The support also provides a bound on the set of free names of a formula. We denote by
P the collection of all Psets.
The denotation of an arbitrary formula A is given by a Pset [[A]]v, where v is a valuation.
A valuation assigns to each propositional variable free in A a Pset. We write f nv(A) as the set
of free names of A under v. Informally, f nv(A) contains the free-names of formula A, adding
the (least) support of the valuation mapping for each free propositional variable occuring in A.
This definition is used in the semantics of the fresh name quantifier, which requires the witness
to be fresh for the Pset denoted by a formula.
Definition 3.2.3. (Property set). [14] A property set is a set of processes Ψ such that:
• For all Q, if P ∈ Ψ and P ≡ Q then Q ∈ Ψ
• There is a finite set of names N such that for all n,m < N, if P ∈ Ψ then P{n↔ m} ∈ Ψ.
For a detailed account of Psets, we refer to [14].
To encode the proper denotation forKϕ, some auxiliary definitions are required. Informally,
the idea is that we want to reason about the terms that exist throughout the process’ code.
We must therefore abstract away the details of the underlying model and focus specifically on
terms. To achieve this, we define a relation `k on processes and knowledge formulas that given
a process extracts the set of terms present in the process, encoding it in a knowledge formulas.
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The resulting knowledge formula can be viewed as a set of terms known by the process, not
considering the equational theory.
When defining the `k relation, some care is needed due to the dual meaning of a term. When
a term is built from constructors, such as enc(x,y), its not necessary that a process that holds
such a term knows x and y, since enc(x,y) might have been received from some other process.
However, when dealing with terms with destructors, which model function application per se,
the several subterms must be known so the application can take place. For instance, a term such
as dec(enc(x,y),y) requires that both subterms (enc(x,y) and y) are also known. Generally all
terms are normal forms either built from constructors or reduced by one (or more) destructors.
However, when dealing with destructors that have name variables, such as in the process:
a(x).a〈dec(x,k)〉.0
where x is a variable bound to the input, the term dec(x,k) is not known per se, since it contains a
name that is still “unresolved”. In fact, after variable x is instantiated by the input term, dec(x,k)
might not be a normal form anymore (if the received term is some piece of data encrypted with
key k). To this extent, it would be unnatural for the example process to know the term dec(x,k),
since x is a name local to the process. Therefore when we define `k, we use an auxiliary
operation on knowledge formulas to remove terms with bound names. However, this removal
cannot be completely blind. Going back to the example process, while the term dec(x,k) is
still “incomplete” and should be removed from `k, it does indeed represent an application of a
destructor, which in itself provides information about the knowledge of the process that cannot
be overlooked.
A similar scenario occurs when considering an equational theory with pairs, as given by the
equations:
first(pair(x,y)) = x
snd(pair(x,y)) = y
And the process:
a(x).a〈pair(dec(x,k), info)〉.0
In the term output, seeing as the pairing depends on the to-be input name, it must be removed.
However, k must somehow remain in the extracted terms, since its being used in a destructor
inside the pairing.
To account for these situations in `k, we use the procedure sub, while the sub-formula
removal is handled by the ↑ operation.
Definition 3.2.4. (Relevant subterm extraction). We define the relevant subterm extraction op-
eration on a term M - sub(M) - as follows ( f denotes constructors and δ destructors):
sub(δ(t1, . . . , tn)) , sub(t1)∪ · · ·∪ sub(tn)
n is not input-bound
sub(n) , n
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@ti with an input-bound name or a destructor
sub( f (t1, . . . , tn)) , f (t1, . . . , tn)
n is input-bound
sub(n) , ∅
∃ti with an input-bound name or a destructor
sub( f (t1, . . . , tn)) , sub(t1)∪ · · ·∪ sub(tn)
Our relevant subterm extraction procedure is sound, in the sense that it never produces
knowledge formulas containing destructor symbols (terms that aren’t actual values), as stated
in Lemma 3.2.1.
Lemma 3.2.1. (Destructor-Freedom of Subterm Extractions). For all terms t, sub(t) = ϕ is such
that ϕ does not contain terms with destructor function symbols. Proof: Appendix A.1
Definition 3.2.5. (Name occurrence sub-formula removal). We define the removal of sub-
formulas of a formula ϕ, in which the name x occurs, ϕ ↑ x, inductively on the structure of
formulas:
(ϕ∧ψ) ↑ x , (ϕ ↑ x)∧ (ψ ↑ x)
t ↑ x , t if x < names(t)
t ↑ x , > if x ∈ names(t)
> ↑ x , >
With the issue of relevant subterms handled, we can now fully define the term extraction
operation on processes.
Definition 3.2.6. (Term Extraction). Given a process P, we construct a knowledge formula ϕ
denoting the set of all terms that the process holds in its “code” with the relation P `k ϕ, closed
by the following rules on the structure of processes:
P `k ϕ Q `k ψ
P + Q `k (ϕ∧ψ)
P `k ϕ Q `k ψ
P|Q `k (ϕ∧ψ)
P `k ϕ
n(x).P `k ϕ ↑ x
P `k ϕ
x〈M〉.P `k ϕ∧ sub(M)
P `k ϕ
(νn)P `k (ϕ ↑ n)
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P{n← M} `k ϕ
let n = M in P `k ϕ∧ sub(M)
P `k ϕ
[M = N].P `k ϕ∧ sub(M)∧ sub(N)
P `k ϕ
(rec X.P) `k ϕ
X `k >
0 `k >
The extraction procedure itself simply collects the terms (and their relevant subterms) as
they occur in the process, applying the removal operation when a bound name is found. Our
extraction procedure aims at collecting only values from the process, as validated by Theorem
3.2.1.
Theorem 3.2.1. (Characterization of Term Extraction). Given a process P such that P `k ϕ, the
knowledge formula ϕ is made up of terms that are values, that is, composed solely of names
and/or constructor function symbols. Proof: Appendix A.2
We now need to define a notion of deducibility for knowledge formulas, where one formula
can be deduced from another if the terms denoted by the deduced formula are contained in the
functional equational closure of the set of terms denoted by the original formula (Def. 3.2.7).
Definition 3.2.7. (Deducibility of knowledge formulas). Given knowledge formulas ψ and ϕ,
we define the deduction relation of knowledge formulas, written ψ |= ϕ as:
ψ |= > , >
ψ |= ϕ1∧ϕ2 , ψ |= ϕ1∧ψ |= ϕ2
ψ |= t , t ∈ F([ψ])
With all the necessary preliminary definitions completed, the semantics of the logic can be
introduced.
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Definition 3.2.8. (Denotation of formulas). The denotation of a formula A is defined by the
Pset JAKv as follows:JTKv , {P|P ∈ P}Jn = mKv , if n = m then P else ∅J¬AKv , P \ JAKvJA∧BKv , JAKv∩ JBKvJA|BKv , {P | ∃Q,R.P ≡ Q|R and Q ∈ JAKv and R ∈ JBKv}Jn®AKv , {P | ∃Q.P ≡ (νn)Q and Q ∈ JAKv}J∀x.AKv , ∩n∈ΛJA{x← n}KvJ Nx.AKv , ∪n< f nv(A)(JA{x← n}Kv \ {P | n ∈ f n(P)})Jα.AKv , {P|∃Q.P α→ Q and Q ∈ JAKv}JXKv , v(X)JνX.AKv , ∪{Ψ ∈ P | Ψ ⊆ JAKv[X←Ψ]}JµX.AKv , ∩{Ψ ∈ P | JAKv[X←Ψ] ⊆ Ψ}JKϕKv , {P | P `k ψ and ψ |= ϕ}JSx.AKv , {P | ∃Q, t.P ≡ (νk)Q and Q ∈ JA{x← t}Kv
and Q `k φ such that t ∈ [φ] and k ∈ names(t)}
The denotations for the behaviour and spatial operators of the logic are the same as presented
in [11]. The boolean connectives, name equality, least and greatest fix-points and first-order
universal quantification are defined standardly. The composition, or separation operator A | B,
allows us to state that a process can be structurally decomposed in two processes, where one
satisfies formula A and the other formula B. This allows reasoning about the subsystems of
larger systems - local and compositional reasoning. The revelation operator n®A, states that
a process has a restricted name n and the process under the restriction satisfies formula A.
This operator allows us to reason under restricted names and (combined with the fresh name
quantifier) allows us to reason about these hidden names as well. The action prefix formula
α.A holds in a process that can perform an action with label α and whose continuation satisfies
A. For the knowledge predicate, we define that such a formula holds true in a process from
which its knowledge-formulaic-encoding of terms (given by `k) can be used to deduce the given
knowledge formula, that is, if we take the terms the process holds, we can combine them through
function application and term reduction in such a way that we obtain the terms denoted by the
given knowledge formula. This technique implicitly models the ability to perform computation
on data to obtain new data (such as applying decryption to received values). For the secret
quantifier, we require that the process has some restricted name k, such that the witness is a
term occurring in the process that lies under the restriction and contains k as a subterm. This
way we are sure that the witness is indeed a term that is secret of the process, in the sense that
only that process can have generated it. By convention, in the action prefix formula, if α is
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empty (written as ) then all possible actions are considered. Such a formula is usually called
next. Also, an alternative syntax (from HML [34]) for the action prefix formula can be used:
〈α〉A.
The satisfaction relation, given the denotation of a formula, is defined standardly as follows.
Definition 3.2.9. (Satisfaction of formulas). Given the set of processes JAKv, a process P satis-
fies formula A under valuation v whenever P ∈ JAKv. Written P |=v A.
Given the already introduced logic, its useful to derive some standard (from spatial and
behavioural logics) idioms such as a quantifier over hidden names H, a free name occurrence
predicate @, existential quantification of names ∃, an “all next” modality , a “always in the
future” modality  and a “eventually in the future” modality ^.
Definition 3.2.10. (Derived formulas).
Hx.A , N.x®A (Hidden name quantification)
@η , ¬η®T (Free name predicate)
∃x.A , ¬∀x.¬A (Existential name quantification)A , ¬¬A (All next modality)
A , νX.(A∧X) (Always modality)
^A , µX.(A∨X) (Eventually modality)
We also define some commonly used formulas. A formula Public,Hx.¬@x, that states that
a process has no “real” restricted name, in the sense that no hidden names occur in the process;
using recursion, we can define a formula that states that the subsystem obtained after removing
all restricted names satisfies some property A:
inside(A) , νX.((Public∧A)∨Hx.(@x∧X))
The inside property is useful when we want to look under all name restrictions without quanti-
fying over them explicitly.
3.2.3 Example
We will now recall on the example of Section 3.1.5, Figure 3.2, and state some properties about
that system using our newly defined logic. When considering the system without the presence
of attackers, we still want to make sure that the message exchanges are such that both Alice
and Bob agree on the session key and exchange the hello message, which can be verified by
checking that it is always true that eventually the system will be able to perform the output on
channel ok. This property, which we can call correctness can be stated as:
correctness , ^〈ok〉 True
Since all processes satisfy True, the correctness property has the intended meaning. Seeing as
the example is very simple, we can trivially verify that System |= correctness. However, we
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don’t want to be limited to properties of systems without the presence of attackers. For this
we will consider the Alice and Bob system composed with the Attacker process, in the process
World.
We want to verify that only Alice and Bob can obtain the value hello, since we’re considering
that value as the privileged information that needs to be kept confidential. We will begin by
defining a property threeHellos, that states that when we eventually look inside the system, by
lifting the restricted names, we obtain three subsystems that know the value hello.
threeHellos , ^inside(K hello | K hello | K hello)
What we now want to verify is that it is never the case that in our World, the property threeHellos
holds, so:
World |= ¬threeHellos
Such is the case since we know that both Alice and Bob will know hello, but since the keys are
never obtained by the attacker, it can never obtain the value hello. We can also state that the
attacker never obtains any of the keys used in the protocol. We first define a property keyLeak,
that uses quantification over the hidden names (the keys) to state that we have a system where
2 subsystems know both keys, and another subsystem (the attacker) knows one or the other:
keyLeak , HshK. HsK. (K(shK∧ sK) | K(shK∧ sK) | (KshK∨KsK))
To state that the keys are indeed never leaked, we need to check if:
World |= ¬keyLeak
With these short examples we hope to transmit some of the ways through which we can state
relevant properties about protocol correctness using our logic, with or without the presence of
attackers.
3.3 A Syntactical Approach to Knowledge Deduction
For the denotation of Kϕ, the functional and equational closure of the set of terms that occur in
the process is used. This approach, while being purely declarative and hence more adequate for
denotational semantics, has the inconvenience that such a closure will always be a set of infinite
cardinality (assuming a non-empty signature), resulting in what at first glance may appear as
undecidable semantics.
To this end, in this section we present a syntactical approach for entailment of knowledge
formulas, defined by a proof system formulated with a sequent calculus of knowledge formulas.
The calculus is equipped with rules generated from the equational theory in order to consider the
ability to combine terms to generate new information, therefore being able to represent the full
scope of derivable information. We then present soundness (Theorem 3.3.2) and completeness
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(Theorem 3.3.6) results for our proof system. From our completeness proof we also obtain an
algorithm (Definition 3.3.5) that computes a sound finite approximation of the functional and
equational closure of a set of terms (Theorem 3.3.4), thus proving the decidability of our proof
system and enabling the implementation of Chapter 4.
Each rule of our calculus therefore represents a possible computational step that a principal
(or an attacker) can perform on a term in order to produce a new term. Our sequents obey to the
following schema Γ ` A, where Γ is a set of formulas and A is an individual formula (similar to
sequent calculi formulations of proof systems for intuitionistic logic). The meaning of a sequent
is that if we can build a proof derivation for Γ ` A, then the set of formulas Γ entail formula A.
Definition 3.3.1. (Proof System K for knowledge formulas). With Γ being a set of logical
formulas, A, B and C individual logic formulas, Σ a signature and E an equational theory, the
sequent calculus formulation for our proof system K for knowledge formulas is defined by the
following set of rules:
Γ,A ` A (Id)
Γ,A,B `C
Γ,A∧B `C (∧: left)
Γ ` A Γ ` B
Γ ` A∧B (∧: right)
For every constructor function symbol f with arity n, such that f ∈ Σ:
Γ ` t1 . . .Γ ` tn
Γ ` f (t1, . . . , tn) (funRight)
Γ, f (t1, . . . , tn) `C
Γ, t1, . . . , tn `C (AttLeft)
For every equation f (t1, . . . , tn) = s ∈ E:
Γ, s `C
Γ, f (t1, . . . , tn) `C (DestrLeft)
Rules (Id), (∧: left) and (∧: right) are standard derivation schemas for conjunction and
identity, from intuitionistic logic. Rule (funRight) represents constructor application on the
right-hand-side of a sequent, stating that we can always entail a constructor application from
knowledge formulas Γ if we can entail each of the function operands from the set of formulas.
Rule (AttLeft) states that any formula we can prove from a set of formulas Γ appended with a
constructor application term can also be proved from Γ appended with each of the operands of
the function application. Rule (DestrLeft) expresses the equalities induced by the considered
equational theory. The idea is that anything that can be proved by a term f (t1, . . . , tn) can also
be proved by a term s if there is an equation such that both terms are equal.
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With such a deductive system, we wish to demonstrate through a purely syntactic manner
when a knowledge formula is a logical consequence of another, in the sense that using the
considered equational theory and function applications over the terms denoted by a formula
we can produce the terms denoted by another. Formally, we want our deductive system K
to be sound - whenever A ` B then A |= B, and complete - whenever A |= B then A ` B. We
will now move towards the proof that our deductive system of knowledge formulas is indeed
well behaved with regard to our semantics. We establish that the system is both sound and
complete in this sense, by first proving some preliminary proof-theoretic lemmas that aim at
assisting the main proofs. Additionally, we define an algorithmic procedure that computes a
finite approximation to the functional equational closure of a set of terms and prove that the
approximation is correct, in the sense that it can accurately represent all terms in the closure.
We also prove the termination of the procedure, thus proving the decidability of our knowledge
formula semantics.
Our first results relate to the admissibility of certain rules, such as Weakening and Cut. A
rule is admissible in a deductive system if it does not add to the deductive power of the system,
that is, adding the rule does not allow us to prove sequents that would be previously unprovable.
Weakening is a rule that states that we can add arbitrary elements to a sequence of formulas,
which intuitively holds since we can always add assumptions to a proof. The Cut rule is a
standard rule in sequent calculi, equivalent to a variety of rules in other proof theories, that
states that given a sequent Γ `C and a sequent Γ,C ` A we can derive Γ ` A. The idea is that we
can “cut”, or eliminate the formula C out of the proof derivation. While this rule makes perfect
sense from an intuitive sense, the Cut rule allows the introduction previously unseen formulas
(formula C) in a proof derivation, which from a proof search perspective can be problematic.
Cut admissibility therefore states that the Cut rule is expendable since it does not add to the
deductive power of the proof system.
We require Cut admissibility to allow transitivity in the sequent calculus, as used in the
proof of Theorem 3.3.5. Nevertheless, such a result is also interesting in a theoretical sense
because it implies that all proofs have a “normal form” in which “all concepts required for the
proof would in some sense appear in the conclusion of the proof” [32].
Lemma 3.3.1. (Admissibility of Weakening in K). If a sequent Γ ` A is derivable in K then
Γ,B ` A is also derivable in K, for any formulas A,B and formula set Γ.
Proof: Induction on the structure of Γ ` A. The proof follows trivially from the induction
hypothesis in each derivation of Γ ` A.
Lemma 3.3.1 is a standard proof-theoretic result in sequent calculi, stating that the Weak-
ening rule does not add to the power of the system. While not being a fundamental lemma for
our results, it is an useful result that simplifies future proofs, where it is convenient to be able
to add formulas to a proof derivation.
We will now head towards the proof of the admissibility of Cut. The idea for the proof is
similar to that of [13]. We begin by defining a proof system KC (Definition 3.3.2) which consists
of our original proof system K extended with the Cut rule, and we prove (Lemma 3.3.3) that
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for all derivations in KC that contain a single instance of the Cut rule, we can build the same
derivation cut-free. Since a cut-free derivation in KC is a derivation in K, we conclude with
Theorem 3.3.1, which establishes the admissibility of the cut rule in our original proof system
K.
Definition 3.3.2. (System KC). Let KC be the proof system obtained by adding to the rules of
system K the following rule:
Γ ` A Γ,A `C
Γ `C (Cut)
Where A is called the cut formula.
Lemma 3.3.2. (Admissibility of Weakening in KC). If a sequent Γ ` A is derivable in KC then
Γ,B ` A is also derivable in KC, for any formulas A,B and formula set Γ.
Proof: Induction on the structure of Γ ` A. The proof follows trivially from the induction
hypothesis in each possible derivation of Γ ` A.
Definition 3.3.3. (Single-cut derivation). A derivation Π in KC is called a single-cut derivation
if it contains a single instance of the (Cut) rule, at the root of the derivation.
Lemma 3.3.3. (Cut Lemma). If a sequent Γ ` A has a single cut derivation in KC then it has a
cut-free derivation in KC.
Proof: Appendix A.3.
Theorem 3.3.1. (Cut Admissibility in System K). If sequents Γ ` A and Γ,A ` C are derivable
in K, then Γ `C is also derivable in K, for any formulas A,C and formula set Γ.
Proof: Since we’re assuming that sequents Γ ` A and Γ,A ` C are derivable in K, we can
safely assume them to be derivable in KC, since the derivation rules of K are a subset of the
derivation rules of KC. We can also safely assume that there exist cut-free derivations of Γ ` A
and Γ,A `C in KC, since such sequents can be derived in K (that doesn’t have (Cut)).
In KC, we can then apply the (Cut) rule to the cut-free derivations of Γ ` A and Γ,A ` C in
order to produce a single-cut derivation of the sequent Γ `C. By Lemma 3.3.3, if sequent Γ `C
has a single-cut derivation in KC, then it has a cut-free derivation Π in KC. Therefore, since Π
is cut-free, it also is a derivation in K, seeing as K is obtained from KC by removing the (Cut)
rule, and thus we prove our the existence of a derivation in K for Γ `C. 
Given these preliminary results, we can now build towards the aforementioned soundness,
completeness and decidability results for our proof system. We begin with the soundness of our
deductive system.
Theorem 3.3.2. (Soundness of K). If Γ ` A is derivable in the proof system K, then Γ |= A.
Proof: Appendix A.4.
49
Through Theorem 3.3.2, we establish that all proof derivations obtainable through our se-
quent calculus are sound w.r.t our intended term semantics. That is, each step in a derivation in
our sequent calculus models an operation (computation) over terms that produces a new term in
such a way that the resulting term is also in the functional equational closure.
We will now proceed towards an algorithm that computes a finite approximation of F and
prove its termination, ultimately resulting in the decidability of our deductive system and as-
sisting in our completeness result. Our approximation aims at producing a finite set of terms,
such that we can then obtain any term of F by simply applying functions to terms of the set,
therefore producing a somewhat symbolic representation of the entire (infinite) term set F.
We begin by defining a function ⇒ over sets of terms. This function takes a set and may
add to the set a new term, if a reduction can be produced by placing terms from the set in a
functional application context. This models the ability to apply functions to terms in order to
reduce them to new terms.
The underlying idea is to understand a rewrite rule as a context where at the top level is
a destructor function symbol, and under it lie contexts of possibly differing depths that consist
solely of constructors. We then allow reductions to take place only in contexts such that the total
context depth doesn’t surpass the maximum possible depth of the instance of the rewrite rule.
The motivation for this restriction is to prevent reductions from producing “redundant” terms
in such a way that one could always add a new term to a set. We therefore allow a reduction
to take place only when a “useful” term is being produced, in the sense that we are not simply
adding terms of the initial set under functional contexts.
Definition 3.3.4. (Augmenting a set of terms). Given a set of terms S , we define the procedure
S ⇒ S 1 as the procedure that produces a set S 1 by extending S with a term produced by the
application of a single rewrite:
S , t1, . . . , tn⇒ S , t1, . . . , tn,M
if δ(ga11 [t1, . . . , tk], . . . ,g
ak
i [tk′ , . . . , tn])→ M,∀i : ai < K
The several gi[. . . ] are contexts where constructors are applied to the terms tk, with a total
nesting depth of i. We require that the nesting doesn’t surpass K, which is the sum of the
maximum nesting in the rewrite rule for δ with the maximum nesting of the terms in S . This
restriction introduces a bound on the size of terms that can be built, in order for the procedure
to terminate.
We write⇒∗ to denote a transitive sequence of applications of⇒ and ; to denote that no
more terms can be added by⇒.
To clarify the nesting depth restriction imposed in the definition of ⇒, consider a set of
terms S such that:
S , {enc(x,y);y}
We want our ⇒ operation to be such that it will not continuously be able to add terms to the
set. In this case, the term x should be added, some other terms might be added as well, but a
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term such as enc(enc(x,y),y) should not. Our definition of ⇒ accurately accomplishes this by
not allowing the context depths to grow indefinitely. By imposing a bound on the total nesting
depth of the functional contexts of⇒, we only allow reductions up to the nesting depth where
they can produce the relevant subterms from the initial set, that is, we only allow contexts up
to the point where the deepest term from the initial set is placed in the deepest location of the
rewrite rule.
We are now ready to define our approximation procedure for a set of terms S . The procedure
blindly applies our⇒ operation assuming it will reach a saturation point, where no new terms
can be added.
Definition 3.3.5. (Approximation of the Functional Equational Closure). We define the set b(S )
as an approximation of the functional equational closure of the term S as follows:
b(S ) = S ′ , S ⇒∗ S ′;
It turns out to be the case that the previously mentioned saturation point is indeed always
reached, as proved in Theorem 3.3.3. Intuitively, since our equations require the right hand
side to be a subterm of the left, every reduction will always produce a smaller term, eventually
reaching a point where no more reductions can be applied.
Theorem 3.3.3. (Termination of the Approximation Procedure). Given any finite term set S ,
the computation of b(S ) always reaches a saturation point and hence always terminates. Proof:
Appendix A.5
In spite of our decidability result, it is still necessary to prove that given a set S , our ap-
proximation b(S ) is indeed such that it serves as a basis from which we can compute any term
of F(S). What we require is that for every term in F(S ), we can generate the term by applying
a functional context to terms of b(S ). It turns out that our approximation procedure is valid
(shown in Theorem 3.3.4), which thus results in a set that does indeed symbolically represent
the whole of F.
Theorem 3.3.4. (Validity of the Approximation Procedure). Given a set of terms S , we have
that:
∀M ∈ F(S ),∃C, t¯ ∈ b(S ) : M = C[t¯]
Where C is an arbitrary function application context. Proof: Appendix A.6
We have thus determined the decidability of our proof system under some reasonable as-
sumptions. Given two knowledge formulas ϕ and ψ such that we want to verify if ϕ ` ψ, we
can compute the approximation of the functional equational closure of the terms denoted by ϕ
and then check if the terms denoted by ψ can be constructed from those in the approximation,
which is evidently a finite process.
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However, our approximation also serves another purpose. We use it to also obtain the proof
of completeness of our proof system. The proof is done in two steps. We first show our proof
system to be complete w.r.t our approximation (which by itself is complete w.r.t to F) in Theo-
rem 3.3.5, by showing that we can simulate the application of functional contexts and destructor
application in our proof derivations. We then produce our main result in Theorem 3.3.6 by us-
ing Theorems 3.3.4 and 3.3.5 and showing that our proof system can simulate the necessary
functional contexts.
Theorem 3.3.5. (Completeness of System K w.r.t the Approximation Procedure). Given a set
of terms S , if M ∈ b(S ) then S ` M. Proof: Appendix A.7.
Theorem 3.3.6. (Completeness of System K w.r.tF). Given the set of terms F(S ), if M ∈ F(S )
then S ` M.
Proof: From Theorem 3.3.4 we have that if M ∈ F(S ) then ∃ C, t¯ ∈ b(S ) : M = C[t¯]. Also,
from Theorem 3.3.5 we know that ∀ti ∈ t¯ : S ` ti. To prove that S ` M, we need only be able to
apply function symbols on the right of the derivation, which we do using rule (funRight):
S ` t1
... . . .
S ` tn
...
S `C[t1, . . . , tn]
We can simulate the functional structure of context C[−] by repeatedly using the (funRight)
rule to apply function symbols when needed, up to the various minimal ti. 
With this we conclude our theoretical results that aim at validating our work. To summarise,
we have shown our proof system for knowledge formulas to be both sound and complete with
regard to its intended semantics (closure of term sets) and we proved it to be decidable, thus
showing the semantics of our knowledge predicate to be decidable and therefore suitable to be
implemented in a tool, as will be elaborated upon in the next section.

4 . Extending the Spatial Logic Model Checker
In this chapter we detail the implementation of the logic and model of Chapter 3 into the Spatial
Logic Model Checker tool. We begin by illustrating the tool itself and some of the internals
of its original implementation. We then go over our implementation goals and identify the
extension points in the implementation. Moving on to the implementation itself, we detail the
relevant parts of our implementation and some of the challenges that were met. Finally, we
present some detailed examples that illustrate the usage of the tool and the framework.
4.1 The Spatial Logic Model Checker: Initial Version
The SLMC is a model-checker that allows the verification of properties written in a spatial-
behavioural logic over pi-calculus processes [60]. The model checking algorithm was imple-
mented using on-the-fly model checking techniques and written in OCaml. Broadly speaking,
the original process language of the tool is similar to our process calculus of Section 3.1 but
without structured terms. Therefore only allowing processes to communicate flat values. The
logic of the tool is essentially our core spatial-behavioural logic (without connectives that relate
to term reasoning).
4.1.1 Syntax
We now present the syntax of the original tool. We begin with the syntax of processes, which is
a fairly straightforward representation of parametrized pi-calculus polyadic processes. We then
present the syntax of formulas of the spatial behavioural logic, and finally present some of the
top level commands of the tool.
The processes are standard pi-calculus processes with a test prefix, a τ prefix, guarded
choice and recursive definitions. The concrete syntax of processes is defined in Figure 4.1.
In this representation, an output prefix x〈y1, . . . ,yn〉 is written as x!(y1, . . . ,yn) and an input pre-
fix x(y1, . . . ,yn) is written as x?(y1, . . . ,yn). The test prefix, that fires on name equality, is written
as [name = name]. The τ prefix stands for an internal computation step. The select construct,
which represents sumations, refers to alternative (guarded) branches, separated by a semicolon.
To allow recursive (and mutually recursive) definitions, the form CapsId(namelist) refers
to a process identifier that can be defined using the top level command de f proc. This command
allows us to bind a parametric process definition to an identifier which can be used in process
definitions.
The syntax of formulas is described in Figure 4.2. The boolean connectives are standard
negation not, conjunction and, disjunction or, implication => and equivalence <=>. Spatial
connectives are void, composition |, decomposition || (dual of composition), name revelation
reveal, its dual revealall and the free-name occurrence connective @. Names can be quantified
over universally (forall), existentially (exists) and we can quantify explicitly over fresh names
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lower F [‘a’ - ‘z’]
upper F [‘A’ - ‘Z’]
letter F lower | upper
digit F [‘0’ - ‘9’]
name F lower (letter | digit | ‘_’)∗
namelist F  | name(‘,’ name)∗
prefix F name!(namelist)
| name?(namelist)
| [name = name]
| τ
process F 0
| process | process
| new namelist in process
| prefix.process
| select {prefix.process (‘;’ prefix.process)∗}
| CapsId(namelist)
| (process)
Figure 4.1: SLMC Process Syntax
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formula F formula | formula
| formula || formula
| formula => formula
| formula <=> formula
| formula and formula
| formula textor formula
| (formula)
| not formula
| void
| true
| f alse
| name == name
| name! = name
| @ name
| exists name . formula
| forall name . formula
| reveal name . formula
| revealall name . formula
| hidden name . formula
| fresh name . formula
| 〈label〉formula
| [label]formula
| minfix CapsId.formula
| (minfix CapsId(namelist).formula)(namelist)
| maxfix CapsId.formula
| (maxfix CapsId(namelist).formula)(namelist)
| CapsId
| CapsId(namelist)
| k
| inside formula
| always formula
| eventually formula
| Id(namelist,formulalist)
label F tau
| name
| ?
| !
| name?
| name!
| name?(namelist)
| name!(namelist)
| ∗
Figure 4.2: SLMC Formula Syntax
56
(fresh) and restricted names (hidden). We can also test for name equality with == and ! =.
Behavioural modalities appear as 〈label〉 and [label] expressing possibility of action and
necessity of action, respectively. The label can be instantiated as an internal reduction step
(tau or ), an input or an output on subject name, any input action ?, any output action !, any
output action on subject name (name!), any input action on subject name (name?), a particular
input action (name?(namelist)), a particular output action (name!(namelist)), or ∗ for any of the
previously specified actions.
Recursive formulas can also be defined using the minfix and maxfix operators, that denote
the least fix point and greatest fix point operators, respectively. The k construct, where k is an
integer constant, denotes processes composed of k components. The inside construct allows
for inspection of a formula under all name restrictions, with all the restrictions revealed using
fresh names. Finally, the always construct can be read as ‘for every possible configuration’ and
eventually as ‘there will be a configuration’, with regard to the system’s internal evolution.
Similarly to process definitions, but not allowing for explicit recursion, a formula definition
can be bound to a formula identifier using the top level defprop command.
4.1.2 Implementation Details
As previously mentioned, the SLMC tool uses on-the-fly model checking techniques. This
entails that the state space of a process is not fully constructed at the start but is called upon
as the model-checking procedure so requires. To this end, we will now overview the internal
representation of processes and briefly describe how the model-checking procedure operates.
For more on the specifics and theoretical aspects of the SLMC tool we refer to [11], where the
model-checking algorithm was presented and proved decidable for a useful class of processes.
Internally, processes are represented in a normal form through an equation system. Every
equation in such a system is identified by an equation variable. In this context, an equation
models the set of all available top level actions of a process, each with a continuation that is
identified by the adequate equation variable. An equation can therefore be read as a set of
summations of actions, composed in parallel, under the necessary restricted names, where the
continuations of each action are referenced by an equation variable. When a process is defined
in the tool, it is transformed into this equational normal form and stored as such.
The model checking algorithm doesn’t manipulate the equation systems directly, instead
manipulating processes as sets of components generated from the equation system. A com-
ponent is essentially an equation, containing top level actions where each continuation is ref-
erenced to by the appropriate equation variable. However, a component is defined by the re-
stricted names of a process in the sense that each component represents a set of processes
running in parallel that are indivisible due to their restricted names. For instance, the process
new x in c!(x) | d!(x) would be represented by a single component that has two output
actions, whereas the process c!(x) | d!(x) would be represented by two distinct compo-
nents, one with the output action with subject c and the other with the output action with subject
d.
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deffun enc/2;
deffun pk/1;
defreduc dec(enc(x,y),pk(y)) = x;
defreduc dec(enc(x,pk(y)),y) = x;
Figure 4.3: Defining Equational Theories and Signatures
The model checking algorithm is driven by the formula that is to be checked, in the sense that
it navigates the state space of the process as the formula so demands. This is accomplished via
three kinds of process iterators: the action iterator, the revelation iterator and the composition
iterator. Intuitively, the action iterator will take a process and an action and produce (at each
iteration step) a process that results from the original process performing the supplied action.
For example, if the considered action is an input and such an action is performable by the
process, the tool will evolve the process by instantiating the input parameters as fresh names.
The revelation iterator, given a process and a name, produces all resulting processes where the
name has been revealed (i.e. taken as a fresh name). The composition iterator takes a process
and returns all possible decompositions of that process.
The algorithm is thus defined inductively on the structure of the formula to be checked,
using the appropriate iterators as needed. For quantification over names it uses the set of free
names of the process plus a fresh name as the domain of the quantifier witness.
4.2 The Spatial Logic Model Checker: Our Extension
We will now detail the several extensions that were implemented on the SLMC tool. We begin
by identifying the key features that needed to be added in order to support the new logic and
model language. We then proceed by describing how such features were implemented.
In spite of all the modifications that needed to be implemented in order to successfully ex-
tend the SLMC tool, we wanted to keep the principal design philosophies of the tool: we wanted
to maintain the internal representation of processes as equations, the components as minimal
units under restricted names, the iterators to explore the state space of processes. Therefore, our
extensions were designed with these goals in mind.
4.2.1 Syntax
First, we needed to adapt the pi-calculus model of the tool to allow processes to handle not just
flat names, but structured terms built up from functions of names. Coupled with this, we also
needed to be able to define the semantics of such functions in order to precisely define our term
reasoning.
To define our function signatures and equational theories, we introduce two new top level
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. . .
term F name
| name(termlist)
termlist F  | term(‘,’ term)∗
prefix F name!(termlist)
| name?(namelist)
| [term = term]
| τ
process F let name = term in process
| . . .
Figure 4.4: SLMC Extended Process Syntax
commands deffun and defreduc. The deffun command allows us to define constructors by speci-
fying a function symbol and its arity. The defreduc command allows us to define destructors by
specifying an equation where at the top level of the left hand side we have a destructor function
symbol, applied to constructors and names, and on the right hand side we have a subterm of the
l.h.s. For example, we can define the signature and equational theory for asymmetric cryptogra-
phy with the commands of Figure 4.3, where we define a constructor enc which will model the
encrypted terms, a constructor pk which models public keys and a destructor dec which models
the asymmetric decryption of terms.
In Figure 4.4 we present the extended process syntax. In the implementation of our pro-
cesses, we extended the output prefix by allowing structured terms to be output, we implemented
our let declaration and we also implemented our attacker output of Section 3.1.4.
Regarding the logic, whose extended syntax is presented in Figure 4.5, we implemented a
new action label that considers output of structured terms, a knowledge connective knows that
allows us to phrase properties of the values a process can produce, given those it possesses and
a secret quantifier, which allows us to quantify over terms that exist in a process and cannot
have been produced by other processes (due to the presence of restricted values).
4.2.2 Internals
We will now overview how the several syntactical extensions to the tool are realised internally.
Starting off with the representation of functions and equational theories, we simply store the
declarations in an internal data structure and define our term rewriting system through a pro-
cedure that given a term, the signature and the sets of equations, generates the normal form of
the given term by generating unifiers with the appropriate rewrite rules. With the term rewriting
implemented, we then proceed to our process calculus model internals.
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formula F . . .
| secret name . formula
| knows knowledge_formula
knowledge_formula F knowledge_formula and knowledge_formula
| term
label F tau
| name
| ?
| !
| name?
| name!
| name?(namelist)
| name!(termlist)
| ∗
Figure 4.5: SLMC Extended Formula Syntax
4.2.2.1 Model
In the input label prefix extension, we replaced the instantiation of the input parameters as fresh
names by instantiation of the parameters as a fresh name or any of the free names that occur
in the process. For the output prefix extension, we simply allow terms to occur in the process
definitions and in the internal representations. We then modified the action iterator to only allow
output prefixes to be fired if the term is valid (i.e. its normal form is destructor-free). For the
let declaration we bind the declaration to the identifier, but only allow processes to proceed past
the declaration if the declared value can be reduced to a destructor-free term. In the test prefix,
we reduce both terms to a normal form and check if they are destructor-free and syntactically
equal for the prefix to be fired.
Finally, to implement our attacker output prefix, we first implemented a relevant term ex-
traction procedure similar to the specification of Definition 3.2.6 but that doesn’t remove terms
with restricted names (although it doesn’t necessarily reveal them to the attacker). This modifi-
cation to the term extraction procedure is required since the idea is that the attacker can output
any term it can construct, including terms with restricted names. For instance, if the attacker
receives a message cyphered with a key that is a restricted name, even though he cannot decrypt
the message if he doesn’t know the key, he can still forward it through a channel. Given this
set of extracted terms, we then implemented a procedure that computes the approximation to
the functional and equational closure of the set, following Definition 3.3.5. Since the definition
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of the attacker output prefix is that we allow the output of any terms in the functional equa-
tional closure, we would have to consider an infinite amount of possible outputs. To circumvent
this, we define a top level parameter in the tool which we name attacker depth. This parameter
defines the maximum function nesting depth for terms the attacker output prefix can indeed
output. We then implemented a procedure that given an approximation of F, a signature Σ and
the attacker depth parameter d, computes the set of all terms that can be generated from the
approximation by applying functions from Σ, with maximum nesting depth d. This parameter
does indeed limit the power of our attackers, seeing how it is possible to have an undetected
attack situation due to the size limit on the messages produced by attackers. However, we be-
lieve it to be possible to statically determine the maximum size of the attacker messages for a
given protocol, which is expected from the work of Rusinowitch and Turuani [53], where they
determine that the size of attacker messages is linear in the size of the protocol.
Lastly, we modified the action iterator to use the previous procedure to generate the terms
that can be output in the attacker output prefix, which are then iterated over to navigate the state
space accordingly.
4.2.2.2 Logic
Regarding our internal implementation of the logical connectives, we implemented the new
action label that considers output of terms via our revised action iterator (Section 4.2.2.1), where
we match destructor-free normal forms of the objects of actions.
The knows connective is implemented by first extracting the relevant terms of the process
according to Definition 3.2.6. Then, similar to what is done for the attacker output, we compute
the approximation of the functional equational closure of the extracted set of terms (following
Definition 3.3.5) and we then verify (per iteration of the approximation procedure for efficiency
purposes), for each term in the knowledge formula, that we can generate such a term given those
that figure in our approximation. This is achieved by iteratively decomposing each term from
its functional context. For instance, if we obtain an approximation b(S ) = {a;b} and we wish to
check if the term f (h(a)) can be generated from the approximation, we first check if f (h(a)) is
in the approximation. Since that is not the case, we then check for h(a) which is also not the
case, for which we finally check for a. Since a is in our approximation then the term f (h(a))
can be known (constructed) by a process who knows a and b.
The secret quantifier is implemented straightforwardly using our term extraction procedures
and the revelation iterator. We use the iterator to reveal an hidden name, extract the terms of the
underlying process, compute the approximation and filter out the terms where the hidden name
does not occur. We then check the quantified formula by instantiating the witness with each
possible term and repeat the process for each restricted name, as needed.
With this we conclude our implementation details for the extension of the SLMC tool. We
do note that some of the techniques we use are proof of concept and aren’t appropriately op-
timised, namely our approximation generation procedure. For this we implemented a prelimi-
nary version of a caching system, that stores approximations for previously computed term sets.
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deffun enc/2;
defreduc dec(enc(x,y),y) = x;
Figure 4.6: Symmetric Cryptography in the SLMC
However, since our approximation procedure may not be fully executed (since we perform our
verifications per iteration), we store not only full approximations but also partial approxima-
tions, which can be re-used in other computations.
4.3 Examples
We will now present two examples of protocols modelled in the tool with the intent of illustrat-
ing its usage and as a way of validating the implementation itself. First, we’ll re-introduce the
example of Section 3.1.5, using the syntax of the tool, as an example of a simple toy protocol
which we verify both standalone (using behavioural properties) and in the presence of attackers,
using spatial, behavioural and knowledge properties. We then proceed to a more complex ex-
ample, which consists of the Needham-Schroeder protocol with asymmetric cryptography [49].
This protocol is a widely known mutual authentication protocol that was found to have a severe
vulnerability [42]. The exploit was such that it was possible for an attacker to falsely authenti-
cate himself as one of the principals of the protocol. We will therefore explain and model the
Needham-Schroeder protocol and verify that indeed such a vulnerability can be detected by our
tool.
4.3.1 A Simple Protocol
Recalling on the example of Section 3.1.5, we have a protocol where two principals, Alice
and Bob, share a symmetric key and wish to agree on a session key they can use to secure
their communications. We then want to verify that the protocol is correct with and without the
presence of attackers.
We begin by modelling the allowed cryptographic operations in our protocol, which in this
simple case consists solely of symmetric cryptography. We model encryption with a constructor
enc of arity two, and decryption with a destructor dec, that receives an encrypted value and
reveals it if the keys match, as defined in Figure 4.6.
We now define our two principals, Alice and Bob. Alice will await for a message m over
channel c, which will then be decrypted using the shared key k. The idea is that this encrypted
message will be emitted by Bob, and will contain the session key. In order for Alice to confirm
that she received the message she will then encrypt the value hello using the session key and
send it to Bob, over channel c, and simply repeat her behaviour.
Bob behaves symmetrically to Alice. He begins by generating the session key key, encrypt-
ing it using the shared key k and sending it to Alice over channel c. He will then await for
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defproc Alice(k) = c?(m).
let sessionKey = dec(m,k) in
c!(enc(hello,sessionKey)).Alice(k);
defproc Bob(k) = new key in
c!(enc(key,k)).
c?(x).
[dec(x,key)=hello].
ok!().
Bob(k);
defproc System = new k in
(Alice(k) | Bob(k));
Figure 4.7: A Simple Protocol in the SLMC
check System |= always eventually <ok!> true;
* Process System satisfies the formula
always (eventually (<ok!> (true))) *
Figure 4.8: Local Correctness
Alice’s reply and check that the received message is indeed the value hello encrypted with
the session key. If such is the case then Bob will emit an ok signal, modelled by an output on
channel ok, and repeat his behaviour.
Our protocol is therefore composed by Alice and Bob running in parallel, both sharing a
symmetric key, as shown in Figure 4.7.
We can now verify that the message exchanges that make up the protocol are correct without
the presence of attackers, in the sense that Alice and Bob can always, after exchanging the
necessary messages, agree on the session key. Since when the session key is agreed Bob outputs
on ok, we can check that for every configuration of our system, we will reach a configuration
where we can observe the ok signal. As shown in Figure 4.8, such is indeed the case.
We now move for the verifications in the presence of attackers. For this we need to model
an attacker for the protocol, which can be done following the schema of Session 3.1.4 for
active attackers, and represent our “World”, which consists of the initial system and the attacker,
defined in Figure 4.9. Our attacker behaves as expected, intercepting the first message of the
protocol, injecting any message it can produce using our notion of knowledge and repeat this
behaviour for the second message of the protocol. The last action acts as a memory, so the
intercepted messages persist throughout the life cycle of the attacker.
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defproc Attacker = c?(x).
c!(*/1).
c?(y).
c!(*/1).
store!(x,y);
defproc World = (System | Attacker);
Figure 4.9: The World and the Attacker
defprop threeHellos = eventually inside
(knows hello | knows hello | knows hello);
check World |= always not threeHellos;
* Process World satisfies the formula always (not threeHellos) *
Figure 4.10: Verification of the hello value
To ensure our toy protocol is correct, we now perform two verifications. First we check that
the attacker cannot obtain the hello value that is exchanged between Alice and Bob. We do
this by expressing an internal configuration of our world where three agents know hello, our
two principals and the attacker. Since we do not want such a configuration to be reachable, we
check that indeed such is the case, as shown in Figure 4.10.
The second verification consists of checking that the attacker doesn’t obtain either the ses-
sion key or the shared key. For this we begin by defining two auxiliary properties for readability
purposes (Fig. 4.11), that model logic conjunction and disjunction over knowledge.
We then express our undesired configuration by quantifying over our restricted names (the
keys) and stating that, under the restrictions, we can reach a state where we have two princi-
pals that know both keys (which are Alice and Bob) and one that knows one or the other (the
attacker). Finally, we verify that such is not the case, as shown in Figure 4.12. Since we know
that Alice and Bob do obtain the keys, we know the attacker cannot obtain either, and thus
conclude our verification of our toy example.
4.3.2 The Needham-Schroeder Protocol
The Needham-Schroeder (asymmetric cryptography) protocol is a standard mutual authentica-
tion protocol in distributed systems. Its goal is to have two principals authenticate each other
(using asymmetric cryptography) with the help of a trusted third party, which acts as a server
that distributes public keys on request.
The protocol consists of seven messages and we assume that each principal only knows its
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defprop kAnd(v1,v2) = knows (v1 and v2);
defprop kOr(v1,v2) = knows v1 or knows v2;
Figure 4.11: Auxiliary Properties
defprop badConfig = hidden k1.hidden k2.
(eventually (kAnd(k1,k2) | kAnd(k1,k2) | kOr(k1,k2)));
defprop noKeyLeak = not badConfig;
check World |= noKeyLeak;
* Process World satisfies the formula noKeyLeak *
Figure 4.12: Key Leaking Absence
A→ S : A,B
S → A : {KPB,B}KS S
A→ B : {NA,A}KPB
B→ S : B,A
S → B : {KPA,A}KS S
B→ A : {NA,NB}KPA
A→ B : {NB}KPB
Figure 4.13: The Needham-Schroeder Protocol
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own secret key plus the public key of the trusted server, which can be used to request any public
key in the system. Using the standard Alice and Bob naming schemes, Alice wants to establish a
mutually authenticated connection with Bob. It begins by requesting Bob’s public key from the
trusted server. The server sends Bob’s public key in a message signed with its own secret key.
Alice will then receive Bob’s key from the server and use it to encrypt a message that contains
Alice’s identity and a nonce that ensures the freshness of the message. Any agent can generate
such a message, but since its encrypted with Bob’s public key, Alice knows that only Bob can
decrypt it. Bob will receive the message and extract the nonce and Alice’s identity from it. Bob
will then use Alice’s identity to query the server for Alice’s key. After Bob receives Alice’s key
he will generate a fresh nonce and send Alice’s original nonce and the new one, encrypted with
Alice’s key. This message proves that Bob successfully decrypted Alice’s message.
When Alice receives the message, she’ll extract the two nonces and compare the nonce she
initially sent with the one Bob believes Alice sent. If they match, Alice will reply with Bob’s
nonce encrypted with Bob’s public key. The nonce test checks the freshness of the message
sequence, while the reply serves as proof for Bob that Alice did receive his nonce. After Bob
receives the final message, he’ll test the received nonce against his own, and if there is a match
both principals will have successfully authenticated each other in such a way that the two nonces
are known only by them. We present the message exchanges of the protocol in Figure 4.13. In
the diagram, A stands for Alice, B for Bob and S for the Server. KP− and KS− stand for public
and secret keys, respectively. NA is a fresh value (nonce) generated by Alice and NB is a nonce
generated by Bob.
However, his protocol is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack. If some attacker can
persuade Alice to initiate a session with him, he can replay the messages to Bob in such a way
that at the end of the attack, Bob will falsely believe that Alice is communicating with him and
that NA and NB are known only to him and Alice. We will now model such an attack.
4.3.2.1 The Man-in-the-Middle Attack
For the attack to take place, the attacker must first convince Alice to initiate a session with him.
This means that in this attack, the attacker must be a member of the system - the server must
have a public key for the attacker. To model these assumptions, we will model our attacker
as a member of the system, and Alice as a process that awaits for a message that contains the
identifier of the agent whom Alice is supposed to initiate a session with.
The message sequence of the attack is displayed in Figure 4.14, not considering the com-
munications to and from the server which remain unchanged. In the message sequence, T
represents the malicious system member, Trudy.
After the second message, Trudy will know Alice’s nonce, and use this information to falsely
convince Bob that he’s communicating with Alice. After the fifth message, Trudy will know
Bob’s nonce, and after sending the sixth message will successfully convince Bob that he is
communicating with Alice.
We will now use the SLMC to verify that such an attack is indeed possible. We begin with
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A→ T : {NA,A}KPT
T → B : {NA,A}KPB
B→ T : {NA,NB}KPA
T → A : {NA,NB}KPA
A→ T : {NB}KPI
T → B : {NB}KPB
Figure 4.14: Attack Message Sequence
deffun enc/2;
deffun pk/1;
defreduc dec(enc(x,pk(y)),y) = x;
deffun sign/2;
defreduc sigcheck(sign(x,y),pk(y)) = x;
deffun pair/2;
defreduc px(pair(x,y)) = x;
defreduc py(pair(x,y)) = y;
Figure 4.15: Needham-Schroeder Signature and Eq. Theory
the necessary signature and equational theory for asymmetric encryption, message signatures
and pairing, as defined in Figure 4.15.
We can now define Alice and Bob. For simplicity, and since the server communications
are not considered for the attack, we will use a public channel servchan for communicating
with the server and a public channel c. Both Alice and Bob behave accordingly to the message
sequence chart of Figure 4.13, with the exception that Alice will first receive the identifier of
the user she should initiate a session with. This idea is that this step will simulate the attacker
convincing Alice to initiate a session with him. Figure 4.16 shows Alice and Bob’s process
code, where both agents know the server’s public key and their own secret key. When Alice
believes to have authenticated with a valid principal, she will emit an ok signal by outputting on
channel okAlice. Bob will do the same over channel okBob.
The server, defined in Figure 4.17, waits for queries on channel servchan and replies with
the appropriate signed key. We model a server who explicitly holds keys for Alice (the [y=a]
branch), for Bob (the [y=b] branch) and for the attacker (the [y=t] branch).
We can now define the attacker (Fig. 4.18). It will begin by obtaining all the public informa-
tion of the system: the public keys of Alice, Bob and the Server. It will then initiate the attack
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defproc Alice(pubServer,secretA) =
c?(host).
servchan!(a,host).
servchan?(x).
let pubh = px(sigcheck(x,pubServer)) in
new nonceA in
c!(enc(pair(nonceA,a),pubh)).
c?(y).
let nA = px(dec(y,secretA)) in
let nX = py(dec(y,secretA)) in
[nonceA = nA].
c!(enc(nX,pubh)).
okAlice!();
defproc Bob(pubServer,secretB) =
c?(x).
let nY = px(dec(x,secretB)) in
let host = py(dec(x,secretB)) in
servchan!(b,host).
servchan?(y).
let pubh = px(sigcheck(y,pubServer)) in
new nonceB in
c!(enc(pair(nY,nonceB),pubh)).
c?(z).
let nB = dec(z,secretB) in
[nonceB = nB].
okBob!();
Figure 4.16: Needham-Schroeder Protocol: Bob and Alice
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defproc Server(pubK_A,pubK_B,pubK_T,secretK) =
servchan?(x,y).
select{
[y=b].
servchan!(sign(pair(pubK_B,y),secretK)).
Server(pubK_A,pubK_B,pubK_T,secretK);
[y=a].
servchan!(sign(pair(pubK_A,y),secretK)).
Server(pubK_A,pubK_B,pubK_T,secretK);
[y=t].
servchan!(sign(pair(pubK_T,y),secretK)).
Server(pubK_A,pubK_B,pubK_T,secretK)
};
Figure 4.17: Needham-Schroeder Protocol: Server
by sending its identifier t to Alice, in order to force Alice to begin a session with him. From
this point on it behaves as a regular attacker, intercepting messages and injecting any message
it can produce in the protocol. If the attacker reaches the end of its message sequence, it will
signal this fact using channel okTrudy. This will mean that our attacker will have successfully
authenticated himself (as Alice) to Bob.
Since our attacker is a member of the system, we must model our system accordingly (Fig.
4.19). We therefore define our system by generating the secret keys for the attacker, Alice, Bob
and the Server. We bootstrap the attack by sharing the public keys of Alice, Bob and the Server
with the attacker, which is running in parallel with Alice, Bob and the Server.
Finally, we can now verify that the protocol does indeed have an attack, by checking if
we eventually reach a configuration where Alice, Bob and our attacker have signalled their
authentications as successful. If the attacker signals okTrudy, it will mean that it has obtained
both the protocol nonces and has finished his attempt of leading Bob to believe the attacker is
in fact Alice. The okAlice signal will mean that Alice has finished her authentication run with
the attacker, therefore having sent her nonce and the nonce she believes was generated by the
attacker (which was in fact generated by Bob). At last, the okBob signal will be given when
Bob believes to have authenticated Alice, after having received the appropriate nonce. The
verification of the attack is given in Fig. 4.20.
This vulnerability can be fixed by changing message number six in the protocol sequence.
That is, replace the message {NA,NB}KPA with:
B→ A : {NA,NB,B}KPA
By adding Bob’s identity to the message, the attacker can no longer trick Alice into a wrongful
authentication. We refrain from presenting the modelling of the fixed version of the protocol,
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defproc Attacker(secretT) =
c?(pkK,pkA,pkB).
c!(t).
c?(m).
c!(*/1).
c?(nounces).
c!(*/1).
c?(n).
c!(*/1).
okTrudy!(secretT,pkB,m,nounces,n);
Figure 4.18: Needham-Schroeder Protocol: Attacker
defproc Sys =
new secretA,secretB,secretT,secretK in
(c!(pk(secretK),pk(secretA),pk(secretB)).
(Bob(pk(secretK),secretB) |
Alice(pk(secretK),secretA) |
Server(pk(secretA),pk(secretB),pk(secretT),secretK)) |
Attacker(secretT));
Figure 4.19: Needham-Schroeder Protocol: System
defprop attack = eventually
(<okTrudy!> true | <okBob!> true | <okAlice!> true);
check Sys |= attack;
- Time elapsed: 73.864063 secs -
- Number of state visits: 42715 -
* Process Sys satisfies the formula attack *
Figure 4.20: The Attack
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defprop attack = eventually
(<okTrudy!> true | <okBob!> true | <okAlice!> true);
check FixedSys |= attack;
- Time elapsed: 182.327999 secs -
- Number of state visits: 39635 -
* Process Sys does not satisfy the formula attack *
Figure 4.21: Fixing the Attack
for briefness purposes, but assert that indeed the fixed version does not have the previously
described vulnerability (Fig. 4.21).
And so we end our example section, by showing analysis techniques for both small and
larger protocols.
5 . Closing Remarks
Recalling our main goal of developing a logic suitable for security protocol analysis, we be-
lieve to have fulfilled this goal through the development of our spatial-behavioural-epistemic
logic. Our logic is adequate for protocol reasoning since not only does it allow us to phrase
interesting properties of protocols in terms of space, behaviour and knowledge, but it does this
while remaining decidable, which then allowed us to develop a model checker for the logic,
thus realising our initial goal. The development of the logic itself was not without challenges,
of which we single out the development of our proof system that despite being composed of a
small number of rules, remains powerful enough to preserve completeness. Perhaps the greatest
challenges of our work were the technical results, specifically the completeness and decidability
results, since not only were these essential in the face of our model checking goals, but also due
to the non-trivial nature of such results.
We will now summarise the full scope of the work that ultimately resulted in this document.
We started by performing a fairly extensive study and presentation of the existing work on
concurrency and distributed system analysis using formal methodologies, and its applications to
the field of security protocol verification (Chapter 2). We contributed to this area by establishing
a process calculus model (Section 3.1), inspired on the existing Applied pi-calculus, that allows
us to represent security protocols as sets of message-passing agents. The agents can then employ
cryptographic techniques to implement the desired protocols that are not built-in but instead
modelled explicitly within the calculus, through sets of equations that define the (symbolic)
semantics of the desired operations. We also define attackers explicitly within the model, by
allowing processes to perform a “special” output operation, that non-deterministically outputs
any value the process can generate.
Over this model, we began with a core spatial-behavioural logic and extended it with epis-
temic flavoured connectives (Section 3.2) . These connectives allow reasoning about processes
at the term level, by permitting us to analyse what values a process can produce by applying
any available operations (such as decryption) over the values it possesses. These three degrees
of reasoning: Spatial, behavioural and epistemic; supply a heightened expressive power that
can be used to phrase interesting properties of security protocols, not only regarding their lo-
cal correctness (i.e. without the presence of malicious agents) but also properties concerning
the correctness of protocols when faced against certain types of attackers, such as Dolev-Yao
attackers.
Regarding the logic, we precisely defined its syntax and denotational semantics and fur-
thered the logic by developing a formal theory of knowledge deduction, embodied in a sequent
calculus formulation that is detailed in Section 3.3. Our proof system gives a syntactical ap-
proach to the semantic-based notion of derivability of information (the ability to compute new
values from existing ones), and we validated the approach by proving it to be both sound and
complete regarding its intended semantic model.
71
72
Furthermore, we proved the existence of an algorithm which allows us to generate a sym-
bolic (finite) representation of the full (infinite) set of derivable information of a given set of
values, and therefore allows us to decide if a certain value can be constructed given a set of base
values. With this result, we produced a proof-of-concept implementation of a model checking
algorithm for our model and logic, as an extension of the Spatial Logic Model Checker tool
(Chapter 4). We validated our proof of concept implementation by modeling and verifying
small toy protocols and by identifying the known man-in-the-middle attack on the Needham-
Schroeder protocol, as detailed in Section 4.3.
From a critical perspective, our explicit modeling of attackers might seem impractical. How-
ever, following the schemas outlined in Section 3.1.4 we can define a fairly standard form for
attacker representation that is fairly independent from the specifics of the attacked protocol.
Additionally, when dealing with more complex attack scenarios, like that of Section 4.3.2, it
becomes inevitable that some additional steps have to be added to the protocol for the attack to
be detected, even when attackers are represented implicitly by the environment (like in [7]). In
our case, we had to model the attacker as a member of the system itself, and manually trigger the
authentication of a principal with the attacker. However, from that point onwards, our attacker
follows our generic schema, which further strengthens our belief that such explicit modeling is
not too cumbersome and can shed some light on how attacks can take place.
Critically, our attacker depth parameter is indeed a limitation of our tool (more-so then of
the framework itself), but, as we have mentioned, following [53], we hope to be able to statically
determine the maximum required depth for attacker messages in future work.
Another possible critique of our work is that our implementation, being simply a proof-
of-concept, is perhaps too inefficient for larger protocols. However, our aim was primarily to
show that our logic could be used in a tool for protocol analysis. A goal which we believe to
have achieved, despite not having considered more sophisticated optimisation techniques. Such
optimisations fall under the scope of future work, which we will now briefly overview.
5.1 Future Work
An obvious follow up work to this dissertation would be to study the complexity of the algo-
rithms we implemented upon our SLMC extension and then research possible optimisations to
the algorithms with the goal of making the tool more robust and capable of handling larger pro-
tocols. An optimisation possibility would be to research a symbolic approach to the term sets,
in order to minimise the term and state-space generation.
We believe that it would also be interesting to study the expressive power of the logic and the
model, by developing process equivalence techniques similar to those of the applied pi-calculus
(eg. static equivalence, behavioural equivalence) and then frame the process equivalence in-
duced by our logic with these equivalence relations.
On a broader scope, it would also be interesting to research other techniques for security
reasoning, such as type and effect systems or static analysis techniques.
A . Selected Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3.2.1
For all terms t, sub(t) = ϕ is such that ϕ does not contain terms with destructor function symbols.
Proof: Induction on the derivation of sub(t) and case analysis on the structure of the term.
1. Case sub(n) = n
Trivial, since n is a name.
2. Case sub( f (t1, . . . , tn)) = sub(t1)∧ · · ·∧ sub(tn) with f a destructor.
From the I.H the several sub(ti) do not contain destructors. Since f is discarded, we are
done.
3. Case sub( f (t1, . . . , tn)) = f (t1, . . . , tn) with f a constructor and no ti contains name variables
or destructors.
Trivial from the fact that f (t1, . . . , tn) is destructor-free.
4. Case sub( f (t1, . . . , tn)) = sub(t1)∧· · ·∧ sub(tn) with f a constructor and some ti contains a
name variable or a destructor.
From the I.H the several sub(ti) do not contain destructors, so we’re done.

A.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2.1
Given a process P such that P `k ϕ, the knowledge formula ϕ is made up of terms that are values,
that is, composed solely of names and/or constructor function symbols.
Proof: Induction on the derivation of P `k ϕ and case analysis on the last step of the derivation.
1. Cases: 0 `k > and X `k >
Trivially satisfied.
2. Case Sum
P `k ϕ Q `k ψ
P + Q `k (ϕ∧ψ)
From the I.H, ϕ and ψ are made up of values, so we’re done.
3. Case Parallel Composition
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P `k ϕ Q `k ψ
P|Q `k (ϕ∧ψ)
From the I.H, ϕ and ψ are made up of values, so we’re done.
4. Case Input
P `k ϕ
n(x).P `k ϕ ↑ x
From the I.H, ϕ is made up of names and constructor terms. The ↑ operation removes
terms with newly identified variable x from ϕ but does not add destructors, therefore
we’re done.
5. Case Output
P `k ϕ
x〈M〉.P `k ϕ∧ sub(M)
From the I.H, ϕ is made up of names and constructor terms. From Lemma 3.2.1, sub(M)
is destructor-free, so we’re done.
6. Case Restriction
P `k ϕ
(νn)P `k ϕ ↑ n
From the I.H, ϕ is made up of names and constructor terms. The ↑ operation removes
terms with the newly identified bound name n from ϕ but does not add destructors, there-
fore we’re done.
7. Case Let
P{n← M} `k ϕ
let n = M in P `k ϕ∧ sub(M)
From the I.H, ϕ is made up of names and constructor terms. From Lemma 3.2.1, sub(M)
is destructor-free, so we’re done.
8. Case Test
P `k ϕ
[M = N].P `k ϕ∧ sub(M)∧ sub(N)
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From the I.H, ϕ is made up of names and constructor terms. From Lemma 3.2.1, sub(M)
and sub(N) are destructor-free, so we’re done.
9. Case Recursive Def.
P `k ϕ
(rec X.P) `k ϕ
Trivial from the I.H.

A.3 Proof of Lemma 3.3.3
If a sequent Γ ` A has a single cut derivation in KC then it has a cut-free derivation in KC.
Proof: Induction on the structure of the derivation of Γ ` A. By the assumptions of the lemma
we have that the derivation is of the form
Π(n)
Γ ` A
Π(m)
Γ,A `C
(Cut)
Γ `C
where Π(n) and Π(m) are cut-free derivations for Γ ` A and Γ,A ` C, respectively. The various
forms of the premise derivations Π(n) and Π(m) fall under the following cases:
1. One of the premises is an instance of (Id).
2. One of the premises is an instance of a rule that doesn’t introduce the cut formula.
3. Both premises introduce the cut formula
We now discuss the identified cases:
1. Case (Cut)-(Id): Suppose (Id) occurs on the right premise of the cut, the derivation must
have the form
Π(n)
Γ ` A (Id)Γ,A ` A
(Cut)
Γ ` A
and we can remove the cut since Γ ` A follows from Π(n), which is cut free. The case
where (Id) appears on the left premise of the cut is handled symmetrically.
2. Case (Cut)-(LL): The cases where the left premise of the cut is a left rule that doesn’t
introduce the cut formula.
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(a) Case (Cut)-(∧L)
Π(n)
Γ,A,B `C
(∧L)
Γ,A∧B `C
Π(m)
Γ,A∧B,C ` D
(Cut)
Γ,A∧B ` D
Applying weakening on Π(n) and Π(m), we construct Π′(n) and Π′(m):
Π′(n)
Γ,A,B,A∧B `C
Π′(m)
Γ,A,B,A∧B,C ` D
Γ,A,B,A∧B ` D
By the induction hypothesis we have a cut-free derivation for Γ,A,B,A∧B ` D
and:
...
Γ,A,B,A∧B ` D
(∧L)
Γ,A∧B ` D
since our sequents have formula sets (and not multi-sets) on the left-hand side, we
have a derivation for Γ,A∧B ` D cut-free.
(b) Case (Cut)-(DestrLeft)
Π(n)
Γ, s `C
(DestrLeft)
Γ, f (t¯) `C
Π(m)
Γ, f (t¯),C ` D
(Cut)
Γ, f (t¯) ` D
Applying weakening on Π(n) and Π(m), we construct Π′(n) and Π′(m):
Π′(n)
Γ, s, f (t¯) `C
Π′(m)
Γ, f (t¯), s,C ` D
Γ, s, f (t¯) ` D
By the induction hypothesis we have a cut-free derivation for Γ, s, f (t¯) ` D and:
...
Γ, s, f (t¯) ` D
(DestrLeft)
Γ, f (t¯) ` D
since our sequents have formula sets (and not multi-sets) on the left-hand side, we
have a derivation for Γ, f (t¯) ` D cut-free.
(c) Case (Cut)-(AttLeft)
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Π(n)
Γ, f (t¯) `C
(AttLeft)
Γ, t¯ `C
Π(m)
Γ, t¯,C ` D
(Cut)
Γ, t¯ ` D
Applying weakening on Π(n) and Π(m), we construct Π′(n) and Π′(m):
Π′(n)
Γ, f (t¯), t¯ `C
Π′(m)
Γ, f (t¯), t¯,C ` D
Γ, f (t¯), t¯ ` D
By the induction hypothesis we have a cut-free derivation for Γ, f (t¯), t¯ ` D and:
...
Γ, f (t¯), t¯ ` D
(AttLeft)
Γ, f (t¯) ` D
since our sequents have formula sets (and not multi-sets) on the left-hand side, we
have a derivation for Γ, f (t¯) ` D cut-free.
(d) Case (Cut)-(RL): The cases where the right premise of the cut is a left rule that
doesn’t introduce the cut formula are handled symmetrically to Case 2.
3. Cases where the cut premisses introduce the cut formula. The last rule on the left premise
is a right rule and the last rule on the right premise is a left rule.
(a) Case of ∧:
Π(n)
Γ ` A
Π(m)
Γ ` B (∧R)
Γ ` A∧B
Π(k)
Γ,A,B `C
(∧L)
Γ,A∧B `C
(Cut)
Γ `C
From weakening we have:
Π′(n)
Γ,B ` A
Π′(m)
Γ,A ` B
We can thus build the derivations:
Π′(n)
Γ,B ` A
Π(k)
(Cut)
Γ,A,B `C
Γ,B `C
Π′(m)
Γ,A ` B
Π(k)
(Cut)
Γ,A,B `C
Γ,A `C
and by the induction hypothesis we have cut-free derivations for Γ,B ` C and Γ,A `
C. We then use such cut-free derivations to construct:
Π(n)
Γ ` A
...
Γ,A `C
Γ `C
or
Π(m)
Γ ` B
...
Γ,B `C
Γ `C
And by the induction hypothesis, there exist cut-free derivations for both sequents.
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(b) Term formulae (funRight + DestrLeft)
Π(m1)
Γ ` t1 . . .
Π(mn)
Γ ` tn (FunRight)
Γ ` f (t1, . . . , tn)
Π(k)
Γ, t `C
(AttLeft)
Γ, f (t1, . . . , tn) `C
(Cut)
Γ `C
From the Π(mi) derivations we can build:
Π(m1)
Γ ` t1 . . .
Π(mn)
Γ ` tn
Γ ` t¯
Γ, t ` t
Γ, f (t¯) ` t
Γ, t¯ ` t
(Cut)
Γ ` t
From the induction hypothesis we can derive Γ ` t cut-free. Finally:
...
Γ ` t
Π(k)
Γ, t `C
(Cut)
Γ `C
And by application of the induction hypothesis there exists a cut-free derivation for
Γ `C. 
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3.3.2
If Γ ` A is derivable in the proof system K, then Γ |= A.
Proof: Induction on the derivation of ϕ ` ψ
We assume ϕ to be of the form v1, . . . ,vk.
1. Cases (Id) and (∧: left)
Trivial from the I.H.
2. Case (∧: right)
ϕ ` A ϕ ` B
ϕ ` A∧B
From the I.H follows that ϕ |= A and ϕ |= B. From the definition of |= we have that ϕ |= A∧B
if ϕ |= A and ϕ |= B, so we’re done.
3. Case (funRight)
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ϕ ` t1 . . . ϕ ` tn
ϕ ` f (t1, . . . , tn)
From the I.H follows that ϕ |= t1 through tn. Since |= is closed by function application,
then ϕ |= f (t1, . . . , tn).
4. Case (AttLeft)
Γ, f (t1, . . . , tn) `C
Γ, t1, . . . , tn `C
From the I.H we have that Γ, f (t1, . . . , tn) |= C, but the set inclusion used in |= is closed by
function application, we can apply f to t1, . . . , tn and therefore Γ, t1, . . . , tn |= C.
5. Case (DestrLeft)
Γ, s `C
Γ, f (t1, . . . , tn) `C
From the I.H we have that Γ, s |= C. Γ, f (t1, . . . , tn) |= C follows from the fact that f (t1, . . . , tn)
reduces to s and the set inclusion used in |= is closed by reduction, therefore Γ, f (t1, . . . , tn) |=
C.

A.5 Proof of Theorem 3.3.3
Given any finite term set S , the computation of b(S ) always reaches a saturation point and hence
always terminates.
Proof: We define a measure on the sets generated by⇒ and show that this measure decreases
monotonically in the sequence S ⇒ S 1⇒ ·· · ⇒ S n.
Given a signature Σ, a base set S and the maximum depth K which is the sum of the maxi-
mum nesting depth for all available rewrite rules with the maximum nesting depth of terms in
S , we define the cardinality L of the set that contains all terms with maximum nesting smaller
than K as:
L = #{t ∈ T (Σ,S ) | |t| < K}
where T (Σ,S ) is the set of all terms generated from signature Σ using the names present in S .
We can now define the measure |S i| as: |S i| = L−#S i
Considering the sequence: S 0 ⇒ ·· · ⇒ S n we can prove that for any S i, |S i+1| < |S i| by
looking at the way S i+1 is built from S i.
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In each step of ⇒, a new term M is inserted in the previous set. Also, by the constraints
imposed by⇒, we know that |M| < K. Seeing as the rule for the application of⇒ is:
S , t1, . . . , tn⇒ S , t1, . . . , tn,M
if δ(ga11 [t1, . . . , tk], . . . ,g
ak
i [tk′ , . . . , tn])→ M,∀i : ai < K
and considering we impose that the right side of a reduction is a subterm of the left, and ∀i :
ai < K, we are sure that |M| < K.
In fact, the size L is the maximum possible size for any set S i, since L is the size of the
largest possible set of terms built from functions of Σ, whose nesting depth is smaller or equal
to the maximum allowed in the rewrite rules for the functions in Σ.
Looking at |S i|, we know the measure is strictly positive, because the existence of S i+1
implies that #S i < L, since L is the size of the maximum possible set of terms, and #S i+1 > #S i
(because S i+1 is obtained from S i by adding one new term M).
From the previous argument, it clearly follows that |S i+1| < |S i|, since |S i| > 0, |S i+1| ≥ 0, L is
fixed and #S i+1 > #S i. Noting that it is only possible for |S i+1| = 0 if S i+1 = S n, by the definition
of L.
Given that |S 0| > |S 1| > · · · > |S n|, the approximation procedure is proven to terminate. 
A.6 Proof of Theorem 3.3.4
Given a set of terms S , we have that:
∀M ∈ F(S ),∃C, t¯ ∈ b(S ) : M = C[t¯]
Where C is an arbitrary function application context.
Proof: Induction on the generation of M ∈ Fn+1(S ). We use Fn(S ) to denote the nth iteration
over the saturation.
1. Case: M ∈ S
Trivially satisfied by the empty context since for every M ∈ S , M ∈ b(S ).
2. Case: M = f (M1, . . . ,Mn) such that ∀i : Mi ∈ Fn(S )
From the I.H we have that ∃Ci, t¯i ∈ b(S ) : Mi = Ci[t¯i] and thus we have the context C =
f (C1[−], . . . ,Cn[−]) such that M = C[t¯1, . . . , t¯n]
3. Case: δ(M1, . . . ,Mn)→ M such that ∀i : Mi ∈ F(S )
From the I.H we have that ∃Ci, t¯i ∈ b(S ) : Mi = Ci[t¯i]. Since δ(M1, . . . ,Mn)→ M and we
impose that the right-side of the rewrite rule to be a subterm of the left-side, we know that
M is a subterm of some Ci[t¯i]. Therefore, the depth of any term M has to be such that:
C′[t¯′] = M
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where C′ is a function context with nesting depth smaller than any Ci, and t¯′ is a subset
of all the ti. This is so due to M being such that it can be constructed by a context sub-
composed of the several contexts Ci that make up the left-side of the rewrite rule.

A.7 Proof of Theorem 3.3.5
Given a set of terms S , if M ∈ b(S ) then S ` M.
Proof: Let M ∈ b(S ). Then there is a sequence S 0⇒ S 1⇒ ·· ·⇒ S n, where M ∈ S n. We proceed
by induction on n.
• Case n = 0:
(Id)
S ` M
• Case n + 1:
From⇒ we have that S n+1 is generated through:
R, t1, . . . , tn⇒ R, t1, . . . , tn,M with S n = R, t¯ and S n+1 = R, t¯,M
if δ(ga11 [t1, . . . , tk], . . . ,g
ak
i [tk′ , . . . , tn])→ M,∀i : ai < K
therefore, from the I.H we have that S ` t1, . . . , S ` tn. We can therefore build a derivation:
...
S ` t¯
(Id)
S , t¯,M ` M
(DestrLeft)
S , t¯,ga11 [t1, . . . , tk], . . . ,g
ak
i [tk′ , . . . , tn] ` M (AttLeft)
... (AttLeft)
S , t¯ ` M
(Cut)
S ` M
The schema for the derivation is a Cut, where the left premise follows from the I.H and
the right premiss consists of a succession of applications of the (AttLeft) rule, which has
the ability to apply arbitrary function symbols (of adequate arity) to terms on the left-side.
With these applications, we reach a point where we have a term context that can match
with the adequate rewrite rule that reduces to M. We then apply the (DestrLeft) rule to
perform the reduction and conclude by using (Id). 
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